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SPEECH OR CONDUCT? THE FREE SPEECH CLAIMS OF
WEDDING VENDORSt
CarolineMala Corbin*
INTRODUCTION

Is baking a cake for a same-sex wedding or photographing the bride-andbride or groom-and-groom "speech" triggering free speech scrutiny? Or is
providing wedding services better viewed as conduct that does not implicate
the Free Speech Clause?
Marriage equality is now a constitutionally protected right in the United
States.' The Supreme Court has declared that denying same-sex couples the
right to marry violates substantive due process and equal protection. 2 This
decision was cause for widespread celebration. 3
However, not everyone is pleased. Many oppose same-sex marriage on
religious grounds.4 Indeed, some in the wedding industry claim that it violates

Copyright C 2015 by Caroline Mala Corbin.
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1 Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

2 id.

3 See, e.g., Perry Stein, Celebration of Same-Sex MarriageRuling Starts Early in D.C., WASH. POST

(June 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/06/26/celebmtion-of-same-sex-marria
ge-ruling-starts-early-in-d-c/.
4 See, e.g., Lauren Markoe, Righteous or Repugnant? Religious Responses to the Supreme Court's
Same-Sex MarriageDecision, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (June 26, 2015), http://www.religionnews.com/2015/06/

26/religious-responses-to-the-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-decision/;

Craig Schneider, Southern Baptist

Convention's Statement Opposing Same-Sex Marriage, ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 17, 2015, 8:45 AM),

http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/southern-baptists-statement-opposing-gay-marriage/nmfLH/;

Press

Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Supreme Court Decision on Marriage "A TragicError" Says
Presidentof CatholicBishops' Conference (June 26, 2015), http://www.usccb.org/news/2015/15-103.cfm.
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their religious beliefs to participate in any way in these mamiages. To do so,
they argue, would make them complicit in sin. 6 Wedding photographers do not
want to take pictures of same-sex unions;7 wedding bakers and florists do not
want to bake cakes or arrange flowers for same-sex ceremonies; and bridal
shop owners do not want to sell dresses to same-sex brides.9
In many places, these vendors are free to refuse service to same-sex
couples, as neither federal'o nor most state public accommodations law bars
discrimination based on sexual orientation." In jurisdictions with LBGT
protections, religious vendors have claimed that these anti-discrimination laws
violate their First Amendment rights. They have advanced religious claims and
speech claims.
For the speech claims, whether baking a cake or taking a picture counts as
speech is pivotal. After all, the Free Speech Clause prohibits the "abridging of
freedom of speech."' 2 At the same time, the clause has been interpreted to
protect conduct found to have an expressive component. For example, burning

5 See, e.g., Why Some Businesses Say "IDon't" to Gay Couples, PBS NEwSHOUR (Jan. 21, 2015, 6:20
PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/wedding-businesses-say-dont-gay-couples/
("I actually feel like I'm
taking part in the wedding. Part of me goes to the reception. And in this case, that part of me doesn't want to
be represented in a ceremony that I believe is unbiblical." (quoting Jack Phillips, Owner, Masterpiece
Cakeshop)).
6 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at *3 (Colo. Office of Admin. Cts.
Dec. 6, 2013) (initial decision) ("Phillips also believes that the Bible commands him to avoid doing anything
that would displease God, and not to encourage sin in any way. . . . Phillips believes that if he uses his artistic
talents to participate in same-sex weddings by creating a wedding cake, he will be displeasing God and acting
contrary to the teachings of the Bible.").
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014).
8 Craig, No. CR 2013-0008; In re Klein, CR 44-14, 45-14 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. Apr. 21 2015)
(synopsis); Ingersollv. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (mem.).
Curtis M. Wong, Pennsylvania's Cake ProsBakery Rejects Lesbian Couple's Cake as Owner Vows to
Stand True to God,'HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/
14/pennsylvania-cake-pros-gay-wedding-_n 5678410.html (quoting a bridal salon owner who stated "that
providing the [same-sex couple] dresses 'for a sanctified marriage would break God's law').
10 Title II of Civil Rights Act bars discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national origin"
in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). It does not ban discrimination on the basis of
sex or sexual orientation. Thus, even though the EEOC has recently ruled that sex discrimination includes
sexual orientation discrimination, Title II reaches neither. Sarah Caspari, 'Sexual OrientationDiscriminationIs
Sex Discrimination,'EEOC Rules, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (July 17, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/USA-Update/2015/0717/Sexual-orientation-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination-EEOC-rules.
1 Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/non discrimination laws (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (displaying map which shows that twenty-eight
states do not ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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a cross on a black family's lawn may communicate hostility and even a threat
of violence.1 3 Burning an American flag often communicates disapproval or
disgust with U.S. policy.' 4 The Supreme Court has recognized both as
expressive conduct implicating the Free Speech Clause.
Should creating a cake or photograph likewise be deemed expressive
conduct that triggers some level of free speech scrutiny? In other words, do
religious bakers and photographers have a compelled speech claim if the
government forces them to render services pursuant to public accommodations
law?' 5 According to the vendors, these laws essentially compel them to express
approval of same-sex marriages-something contrary to their deeply held
beliefs.' 6
To be clear, the question for this Article is not whether public
accommodation laws violate the Free Speech Clause but whether they even
trigger free speech review. Or to put it another way, the question is not whether
the wedding vendors' conduct is ultimately protected by the Free Speech
Clause, but whether it is covered by it at all.
The two types of vendors are not entirely analogous. Photography, a branch
of art, has long been recognized as a mode of communication in much the
same way words are. 17 Baking, in contrast, has not. Thus, the photographers'
challenge also raises the question of whether conduct involving words or
photographs necessarily amounts to speech that is covered by the Free Speech
Clause.
Part I describes the current free speech doctrine surrounding expressive
conduct. In particular, it examines the Spence v. Washington test for deciding
whether conduct is deemed expressive or not.
13 Virginiav. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
14 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
15 This Article does not address the vendors' potential compelled expressive association arguments. They
are inapposite, anyway. In Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts were an
expressive association and that a public accommodation law that required the Boy Scouts to accept gay
scoutmasters violated their freedom of expressive association. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). Even assuming that
commercial bakeries and photography studios are expressive associations, they are not membership
organizations, and public accommodation laws do not force them to accept unwanted members. Scoutmasters
might be members of the Boy Scouts, but customers are not members of bakeries or photographic studios. Cf
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006) ("Unlike the public
accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school 'to accept members it
does not desire."').
16 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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Part II considers whether a cake baked by a vendor for a same-sex wedding
should be covered speech. It proposes that compelled expressive conduct-a
little-analyzed category-does not trigger free speech scrutiny unless the
compelled actor is forced to convey a message with which she disagrees. To
find otherwise would exacerbate a recent trend, characterized as revival of
Lochner-era libertarianism, of using the First Amendment to skirt government
regulation. Part II then concludes that baking a cake is not covered speech, as
the business context essentially neutralizes any potential message of
endorsement.
Part III addresses the question of whether photographs by a professional
wedding photographer should amount to covered speech. It contemplates-but
ultimately rejects-the possibility that any conduct involving words or
photographs must implicate free speech. It also suggests that both the regulated
photographs and the challenged regulation must be considered in answering
this question. It finds that, at most, the photographers' claims trigger
intermediate scrutiny. My conclusions here are more tentative. This Article
finishes by warning against the tendency to automatically value free speech
over equality.
I.

ExPREssivE CONDUCT DOCTRINE

Laws that regulate conduct with an expressive component are subject to
heightened scrutiny. Whether conduct has an expressive element is (often but
not always) determined by the test set forth in Spence v. Washington 8 : conduct
is deemed expressive if the actor intended to express a particularized message
and that message is understood by the audience.1 9 Due to open questions and
inconsistent application, it is not altogether clear how the Spence test would
apply to bakers and photographers who decline to provide wedding cakes or
wedding photographs.
A.

O'Brienand Spence Tests
1. United States v. O'Brien

Regulations of conduct with an expressive component must be closely
scrutinized. When the regulation targets the expressive conduct because of its

418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
19

Id at 410-11, 415.
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message, then, like all content-based regulations, 20 it is subject to strict
scrutiny. 2 1 For content-neutral regulations of expressive conduct, the test from
United States v. O'Brien22 controls. After David Paul O'Brien burned his draft
card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse to protest the Vietnam
War,23 he challenged the statutory amendment that made such conduct
24
illegal. Under O'Brien, the first question is whether the regulation really is
content neutral, or whether its true purpose was to censor speech.2 5 If the latter
is true, then strict scrutiny applies. If the regulation's goal is unrelated to the
suppression of speech, and the effect on speech is incidental rather than
26intentional, then intermediate scrutiny applies.
In addition to applying
intermediate scrutiny, courts also ask whether the regulated speaker has
alternative means of communicating her message. 27 If the regulation fails
intermediate scrutiny, or the speaker lacks alternate means, then the regulation
violates the Free Speech Clause.
Because intermediate scrutiny is so malleable, whether a regulation passes
it can be difficult to predict.28 The alternative means of communication
requirement is also imprecise, with different lower courts requiring different

20 McCullenv. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014) (noting that content-based regulations are subject
to strict scrutiny). The one exception to this rule-content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulations in a
nonpublic forum-does not apply, since the wedding vendor cases do not occur in nonpublic forums.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800, 806 (1985).
21 City of Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) ("If the government interest is related to the
content of the expression, however, then the regulation falls outside the scope of the O 'Brien test and must be
justified under a more demanding standard.").
22 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
23 Id at 369.
24 Id at 375 (noting that 1965 Amendment made it a crime to "knowingly destroy" or "knowingly
mutilate" a draft card).
25 City ofErie, 529 U.S. at 289 ("To determine what level of scrutiny applies to the ordinance at issue
here, we must decide 'whether the State's regulation is related to the suppression of expression."' (quoting
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989))).
26 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (describing O'Brien as requiring
intermediate scrutiny). Note that in Humanitarian Law Project itself, the Supreme Court did not apply
intermediate scrutiny because it held that the law as applied to plaintiffs was not content-neutral. Id. at 272324.
27 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting that expressive conduct
regulations must "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information").
28 Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious FirstAmendment: Alvarez and Knox in the
Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 491, 500 (2013) ("The big knock on intermediate scrutiny
generally is that it is too malleable and indeterminate in its application.").
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showings. 29 All of this assumes, of course, that the challenged conduct has an
expressive component.
2.

Spence v. Washington

The threshold question-and the principal question for this Article-is:
When does conduct qualify as expressive? The question here is not whether the
conduct is ultimately protected by the Free Speech Clause, but whether it is
covered by it. In other words, the question is not whether the Free Speech
Clause is violated, but whether the Free Speech Clause is triggered. 30
Under Spence v. Washington,3 1 conduct is considered to have an expressive
component sufficient to trigger free speech scrutiny if (1) the speaker intended
to send a particularized message and (2) her audience understood that
message.32 In answering these two questions, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of context. When analyzing whether a peace sign
taped onto an American flag counted as expressive, the Spence Court observed,
"[T]he context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is
33
important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol."
Historically, the Supreme Court has adopted a relatively narrow view of
expressive conduct. In O'Brien, the Court worried that all conduct risked
becoming expressive conduct if only the intent of the speaker were considered:
"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea." 34 Thus, the Court insisted that the particular
message be understood by the audience as well.
29 R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-NeutralRegulation of Speech: The Limitations of a
Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMIL. REV. 333, 352 (2006) ("The phrasing of this alternative-speech-channels
requirement unpredictably varies from case to case, as does the rigor or laxity of its demands in practice.").
30 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Architecture of the FirstAmendment and the Case of Workplace
Harassment, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1361, 1368 (1997) ("To say that speech is 'speech'-that it is covered
by the First Amendment-is not to conclude that it is protected.").
31 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
32 Id; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (describing test as "whether [a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it" (alteration in original)).
33 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
34 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The Supreme Court repeated this concern in
Rumsfeldv. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65-66 (2006) ("But we rejected the
view that 'conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea.' Instead, we have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently
expressive." (citation omitted)).
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In O'Brien itself, the Court assumed without deciding that burning a draft
card was expressive conduct, 35 though one suspects everyone knew exactly
why O'Brien burned his draft card.36 In Texas v. Johnson, however, the Court
expressly acknowledged that burning an American flag-an inherently
symbolic item 3 7-at a political protest during the Republican National
Convention 38 amounted to expressive conduct. 39
3.

Expressive Conduct in Speech vs. Religious Claims

While this Article focuses on the free speech claim of religious objectors,
most simultaneously bring a religious liberty claim. Consequently, it is worth
noting that there is an important difference between triggering the Free Speech
Clause and triggering the Free Exercise Clause or a statute like the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),40 or a state counterpart, 4 ' via expressive
conduct.

-

35 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element
in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that
the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity.").
36 Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1098 (1968) ("The conduct [ofburning draft cards]
has no other explanation than the desire to communicate.").
37 491 U.S. at 405 ("That we have had little difficulty identifying an expressive element in conduct
relating to flags should not be surprising. The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our
country . . . .").
38 Id. at 399.
39 Id at 406 ("In these circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct 'sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication' to implicate the First Amendment." (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
40 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). Because it is more expansive,
recent religious liberty cases have relied on RFRA rather than the Free Exercise Clause. See infra note 42; see,
e.g., Burwellv. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014).
41 RFRA applies only to federal laws. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534, 536 (1997). Many
states, however, have passed their own version of RFRA that governs their laws. States with RFRA
counterparts include Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01 (2011); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-571b (West 2013); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-761.05 (West 2010); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 73-401 to 73-404 (West 2006); Illinois, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2011); Indiana, S.
Enrolled Act No. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015) (codified at IND. CODE §§ 34-13-9-1 to
9-11); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5301 To 60-5305 (West Supp. 2014); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 446.350 (West Supp. 2014); Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:5231-13:5242 (2012); Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (West Supp. 2014); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.302 (West 2013); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 22-5 (West 2003); Oklahoma, OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251-258 (West 2008);
Pennsylvania, 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401-2407 (2015); Rhode Island, 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 42-80.1-1 to -80.1-4 (West 2014); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §1-32-10 to -32-60 (2006);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 2013); Texas, TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. § 110.003 (West 2011);
and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1 to 57-2.1 (West 2009). One state-Alabama--amended its constitution.
Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment of 1998, ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 (amended 1999).
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At first glance, the two appear parallel. In religious liberty challenges,
especially under RFRA,42 the question is whether the regulation substantially
burdens religion. 43 In free speech challenges, the question is whether the
regulation burdens expression. As formulated, religious protection seems more
difficult to obtain, as existing tests require that the burden on the ability to
practice religion be substantial.44
In fact, it can be easier to trigger religious protections because courts-in
particular the current Supreme Court-have proven to be highly deferential to
subjective claims of substantial religious burden. In its most recent case
addressing the question, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,4 the Supreme
Court suggested that as long as the religious objectors were sincere, they
essentially decide what counts as a substantial religious burden that triggers
RA. 46
This deference to religious objectors is partly due to the Establishment
Clause, which bars courts from resolving theological disputes. Courts worry
that declaring a religious burden insubstantial comes too close to parsing
theology, a task outside their institutional competence.4 8

42 Under the Free Exercise Clause, religious exemptions become available if (1) a law is not neutral and
generally applicable, (2) the law imposes a substantial religious burden, and (3) the law fails strict scrutiny.
See generally Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The national and state
RFRAs eliminate the first requirement and grant religious exemptions whenever a law that imposes a
substantial religious burden fails strict scrutiny.
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) ("Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.").
44 Because the constitution does not provide protection against neutral laws of general applicability, this
is truer for statutory protections. See supra note 42.
45 134 S. Ct. 2751.
46 Id. at 2779 ("[lIt is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead,
our 'narrow function... in this context is to determine' whether the line drawn reflects 'an honest
conviction,' and there is no dispute that it does." (citation omitted)). There is a limit to this deference. So far,
every court of appeals (but one) that has considered the question has rejected the claim of non-profits that
filing the paperwork to obtain an exemption from the contraception mandate is itself a substantial religious
burden. See, e.g, Geneva Coll. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 444 (3d Cir.
2015), cert. granted, No. 15-191, 2015 WL 4765464 (Nov. 6, 2015).
47 See, e.g., Andrew Koppleman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 108 (2002) ("The Establishment
Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth.").
48 See, e.g., Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("What
principle of law or logic [could] be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is
'central' to his personal faith?").
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With speech, no such deference to the religious objector's view is
warranted. First, no Establishment Clause concerns loom over court decisions
regarding whether conduct counts as expressive or not. It is a question about
speech, not about religion. Second, free speech doctrine makes clear that the
plaintiffs subjective view-the speaker's intent-is not the only consideration.
The audience must also understand the message communicated.
B. Spence v. Washington Applied to Wedding Vendors
It is uncertain how the wedding vendors' claims come out under Spence v.
Washington. The difficulty lies not in the first question-whether the speakers
have a particular message, but in the second-whether an audience would
understand that message. Contributing to the uncertainty is both unresolved
doctrinal questions and inconsistent application of the Spence test. Recent case
law suggests that an act must be "inherently expressive" in order to trigger free
speech scrutiny. Although the coherence of an "inherently expressive" inquiry
is open to question, controlling precedent suggests that baking a cake, at least,
would not be viewed as inherently expressive conduct. 49 Taking a picture
might warrant a different conclusion.
1. Speaker 's Intent
The first Spence factor requires that the speaker intend to communicate a
message. How particularized the message must be is uncertain. In Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the Supreme Court
seems to have rejected the particularized requirement, holding that "a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,
which if confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message,' would
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of
Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll." 50
In any event, this requirement is not likely in dispute insofar as wedding
vendors are concerned. Every objecting baker, florist, and photographer who
refuses to provide services for a same-sex ceremony resists sending a particular
message, namely, "I endorse or condone same-sex weddings." 5' For them,

49 I am assuming a cake with no text on it.
50 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation omitted).
51 Actually, they object to endorsing same-sex unions as well. The photography studio in Elane
Photography was not asked to memorialize a same-sex wedding-which at the time was still illegal in New
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creating a cake or taking a picture for a same-sex ceremony conveys approval
of that union, an approval they do not wish to bestow. This is true even when
the cake (or photograph) has no explicit written message of support. 52 As one
couple argued, "compelling them to prepare a cake for a same-sex wedding is
equivalent to forcing them to 'speak' in favor of same-sex weddings." 53
In short, while existing doctrine is unclear about how particularized the
speaker's intended message must be, the first Spence factor is likely satisfied
by the wedding vendors who do not wish to communicate approval of samesex unions.
2. Audience Understanding
The second Spence factor for determining which conduct is expressivehow audiences read the provision of a wedding service-is not so readily
satisfied. The most analogous precedent suggests that the second factor is not
met and therefore public accommodations laws are not compelling expressive
conduct. However, because the photographers' claim involves a recognized
mode of communication, their claim differs from the bakers.
Moreover, the existing doctrine has not yet resolved questions such as
whether conduct deemed expressive must be inherently expressive and what
role context plays in that analysis, whether the audience is actual or
hypothetical, and at what level of generality the conduct ought to be described.
Although this Article makes some normative suggestions on how to fill in
those doctrinal holes, these answers alone do not lead to a conclusive result
regarding the wedding vendors' claims.

Mexico-but a same-sex "commitment ceremony." Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
52 The bakers, for example, believe that a cake need not bear the words "I approve of same-sex
weddings" or any other written message in order to communicate a pro-marriage equality message. See Craig
v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at *7 (Colo. Office of Admin. Cts. Dec. 6, 2013) (initial
decision).
53 See id.; see also Paul Hosford, Cork Company Offers to Make Invite for Gay Couple Refused by
Printer, THEJOURNALiE (Mar. 6, 2015, 8:37 AM), http://www.thejournal.ie/gay-wedding-invite-printer-offershelp-1976272-Mar2015/ (quoting printers that refused to print wedding invitations to a same-sex couple: "We
have never hidden our faith from our customers and represent the gospel at every opportunity. . . . [W]e do not
support same sex marriage, which printing wedding invitations would do").
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a. Rumsfeld v. FAIR and "InherentlyExpressive" Conduct
In its most recent decision to directly address this threshold question of
when conduct is expressive, Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc. (FAIR), the Supreme Court suggested that regardless of speaker
intent, conduct must be "inherently expressive" in order to warrant free speech
concern.54 In FAIR, the Supreme Court rejected a claim by a consortium of law
schools that allowing the military to interview students on campus
communicated endorsement of military recruitment policies.5 5 At the time, the
military still enforced "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 56 and the schools did not want
to be seen as condoning this discriminatory policy.57
The Supreme Court held that providing military recruiters access to campus
was not inherently expressive.58 The Court argued that without an explanation
by the schools, no one would realize that military recruitment occurred offcampus because of opposition to this policy rather than, say, lack of space.59
Furthermore, "[t]he fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong
evidence that the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it
warrants protection under O 'Brien."60 Because providing access to campus
was not inherently expressive, it was deemed conduct, not expressive
conduct.61

Is providing wedding services inherently expressive such that vendors need
not explain their reluctance to provide them? It is unlikely. Because FAIR held
that without an explanation, simply providing equal access to recruiting
services does not in fact convey any message, it suggests the same is true for

54 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) ("[W]e have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is
inherently expressive."); cf Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 ("Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion,
and the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest marches.").
55 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52 ("They would like to restrict military recruiting on their campuses because they
object to the policy Congress has adopted with respect to homosexuals in the military.").
56 Under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy, in effect from 1993 to 2010, gay servicemen and women
were allowed in the military as long as they kept their orientation secret. Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban
Against Openly Gay MilitaryPersonnel, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/
politics/I9cong.html.
57 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64-65.
58 Id at 66.
59 Id
60 id
61 Id ("Unlike flag burning, the conduct regulated by the Solomon Amendment is not inherently
expressive.").
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providing equal access to commercial services. 62 Although an audience needs
no additional information when it witnesses someone bum an American flag, it
might if a wedding vendor replied to an email request with a simple "No."
After all, perhaps the bakery or studio declined because it was overbooked. It
is only when the vendor accompanies its refusal with the statement, "We are
sorry, we cannot condone your marriage," that its message is communicated.
Thus, if disapproval is conveyed, it is conveyed by what is said or written,
rather than by not baking a cake or taking a picture.
Then again, the Supreme Court has not always insisted that conduct be
"inherently expressive,'63 nor is it clear whether this test is even workable
without taking context into account. Spence itself asks whether an audience
understood the message given its context: "An intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and in the surroundingcircumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." 64
Granted it is easier for an audience to read conduct as expressing a message if
the conduct is "inherently expressive," but conduct that is not inherently
expressive may present as expressive in the right context. For example, sitting
is not inherently expressive, but sitting at a segregated lunch counter may well
be expressive.65 Indeed, one wonders whether any conduct is actually so
"inherently expressive" that it doesn't need some context. Even burning a flag
does not always communicate political criticism, as one could be incinerating
it because it is worn out. 66
62 Id. ("An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the law school has no way of
knowing whether the law school is expressing its disapproval of the military, all the law school's interview
rooms are full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they would rather interview
someplace else.").
63 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) ("Being 'in a state of nudity' is not an
inherently expressive condition. As we explained in Barnes, however, nude dancing of the type at issue here is
expressive conduct. . . ."); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) ("It is also
true that a message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in context,
would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.").
64 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (emphasis added).
65 Clark, 468 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[S]itting or standing is not conduct that an observer
would normally construe as expressive conduct. However, for Negroes to stand or sit in a 'whites only' library
in Louisiana in 1965 was powerfully expressive; in that particular context, those acts became 'monuments of
protest' against segregation."); cf Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion) (protesters at
segregated library); Garnerv. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (protesters at segregated lunch counters).
66 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) ("We have not automatically concluded . . that any
action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment
purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred."). Similarly, one might wonder whether
burning a cross is "inherently expressive" when context might be needed to determine exactly what is being
expressed. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion) ("The act of burning a cross may
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Moreover, the analysis for bakers vs. photographers differs because even if
the provision of services is not inherently expressive, photographs may be. So
the fact that the photographer is providing photographic as opposed to baking
services may mean there is a free speech component after all. In Holder v.
HumanitarianLaw Project, for example, the Court held that even though the
ban on providing material aid to designed terrorist groups generally applied to
conduct, when it applied to providing material aid in the form of expert
advice, 67 free speech analysis was required. 68 Then again, FAIR held that
sending emails as part of providing equal access would not require free speech
analysis. 69 Whether FAIR or HumanitarianLaw Projectcontrols depends both
on whether taking wedding pictures is more like sending emails or providing
expert advice, and on whether public accommodation law is more like FAIR's
equal access law or Humanitarian Law Project's material support law. 70
Assuming the photographers are analogous to the HumanitarianLaw Project
plaintiffs, and they may not be, then O'Brien scrutiny applies if the public
accommodation law is content-neutral (as it seems to be) and strict scrutiny if
it is content-based (as the regulation was in HumanitarianLaw Project).7
To sum up the discussion on audience reception so far: The Supreme Court
has held that conduct must be inherently expressive in order to trigger free
speech scrutiny and has further found that providing equal access is not
inherently expressive. However, taking pictures may be inherently expressive
in a way that baking cakes is not and in any event the "inherently expressive"

mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may mean only
that the person is engaged in core political speech."). Although perhaps burning a cross is always inherently
expressive, and context is necessary only to determine what exactly is being expressed.
67 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (describing what was at issue as "whether the Government may prohibit
what plaintiffs want to do-provide material support . . in the form of speech").
68 HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723-24 ("The Government is wrong that the only thing
actually at issue in this litigation is conduct .... The law here may be described as directed at conduct... but
as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a
message.").
69 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) (noting that although
"recruiting assistance provided by the schools often include elements of speech[]" nonetheless "[t]here is
nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse[]" and
furthermore the compelled speech "is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment's regulation of conduct").
70 Note that by its own terms, the material support law regulates speech, since the law defines material
support as including expert advice and assistance. HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2714 ("[I]n 2001,
Congress amended the definition of 'material support or resources' to add the term 'expert advice or
assistance."').
71 Id at 2723-24 (finding that the law was content-based because "Plaintiffs want to speak to the PKK
and the LTTE [designated terrorist groups], and whether they may do so under § 2339B depends on what they
say").
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test is flawed. Nonetheless, even if conduct need not be "inherently
expressive" and context may be taken into account, the conduct still must
express a message that audiences understand. Thus, the question remains: How
does an audience read the act of providing wedding services like baking a cake
or taking a photograph, and what guidelines should inform the analysis?
b.

Second Factoras SocialMeaning

Asking whether an audience would understand the vendors' message once
context is taken into account raises further questions: Should the audience be
the actual audience or a hypothetical audience? At what level of generality
should the act be described? And what context should matter? Is it the general
cultural context, the individualized context of a particular exchange, or both?
For example, does the meaning of baking a cake remain ambiguous when a
baker who initially agrees to provide a cake to a bride changes her mind after
discovering the wedding has two brides? Is this the type of context that ought
to be considered? Because the Supreme Court has never definitively answered
these questions, this section demarcates some guidelines.
I suggest refraining the second Spence inquiry as: "What is the social
meaning of the contested act?" Here, what is the social meaning of
professional vendors whose shops are open to the public providing wedding
cakes or photographs? Social meaning has been described as "the semiotic
content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular
context"72 or "the expressive dimension of conduct . . in the relevant
community." 73 In other words, it is the meaning society attaches to particular
conduct in a particular time and place.
Analyzing the second Spence factor in terms of social meaning does not
answer all the questions the Supreme Court has left unanswered about
audience, context, and level of generality. Nevertheless, the issue of whether

72 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 951 (1995) [hereinafter
Lessig, Social Meaning]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1422, 1451
(1996) ("By 'social meaning' I mean a name and a price given to an action, inaction, or status that (a) in a
particular community has a well-defined association (whether positive, or negative, or neutral) and that (b) is
internalized by a significant portion of the community with which the meaning is a social meaning. . . .").
73 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and SocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 925 (1996) ("Social norms
help people assign 'social meaning' to human behavior. With this term I refer to the expressive dimension of
conduct (not excluding speech) in the relevant community. Social meaning is a product of social norms."
(footnotes omitted)).
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the audience is actual or hypothetical74 may not much matter as either audience
is presumably aware of the cultural significance of an action. With regard to
context, social meaning analysis necessarily looks at the broader social
context, as social meaning of an act depends on that context.
As for the level of abstraction, the social meaning analysis begins at a
higher level of abstraction. In order to understand the social meaning attached
to a wedding vendor's creation of a cake or photograph for a wedding
customer, it is essential to know the message that is generally conveyed when
vendors sell something to someone at a place of business open to the public.
One might think of this inquiry as another way of asking, or related to, whether
the conduct is inherently expressive-whether it carries some particular
message. The answer to that could (and this Article argues should) create a
presumption: if the category of conduct is generally understood as expressive,
the challenged conduct is presumed expressive and vice versa.
However, starting with a higher level of abstraction does not mean
disregarding the circumstances of the particular refusal, as presumptions are
rebuttable. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, specific circumstances
can imbue an otherwise nonexpressive act with meaning, like sitting at a lunch
counter in the South during the Civil Rights Movement.75
The Supreme Court has never articulated its approach quite like this, even
assuming it has a consistent approach. Earlier cases like Spence have
highlighted the importance of context; more recent cases focus on the inherent
expressiveness of the general category of conduct-such as hosting recruiters
or marching in a parade. 76 To the extent that these cases can be reconciled, it
may be that the Court did not think the particular circumstances in the recent
cases overcame the category presumption. After all, if the general category
creates a presumption, starting with the category does not preclude continuing
with the more immediate circumstances to confirm or rebut that presumption.
An approach along these lines best captures whether conduct is expressive.
Conduct enters the realm of free speech when it communicates. Since the

74 As opposed to actual audiences, hypothetical audiences are generally presumed to be reasonable and
aware of the history and cultural significance of an action. Because it has never pinpointed which of the two
controls, or even discussed the issue, the Supreme Court may already be assuming a "reasonable and
informed" audience. In any event, it is not clear how often this different viewpoint would lead to a different
outcome.
75 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 54.
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nature of communication includes both someone who speaks and someone
who listens,77 any test should, as in Spence, include both a speaker prong and
an audience prong.78 An audience prong that considers only the general
category may miss the cases where the circumstances imbue the conduct with
an expressive component, like protestors sitting at a lunch counter. Moreover,
the fact that the meaning of specific conduct will invariably be informed by the
meaning of its category of conduct advises against an approach that looks only
at the particular. 79 Consequently, in thinking about whether conduct
communicates, the general category of conduct should establish a presumption
of expressiveness, which can be rebutted by the particulars of the individual
case.
Although the Supreme Court has not described its approach to expressive
conduct in this way, this approach is not necessarily inconsistent with Supreme
Court doctrine either. To be clear, framing the second Spence factor as an
inquiry into social meaning is this Article's recommendation on how to
implement the Spence test. It works within the confines of precedent (Parts II
and III are not as tethered to existing doctrine). Although it fills in gaps, it is
consistent with existing law.
To conclude, FAIR suggests that providing equal access is not expressive
conduct that merits free speech scrutiny. Is FAIR's conclusion correct? What is
the social meaning of a place of public accommodation baking a cake for a
wedding, or taking photographs of a wedding? Is there something about the
individual cases that changes the analysis? Or, as HumanitarianLaw Project
suggests, is there something about photography that does? The next two Parts
explore that question as applied to bakers and photographers who open their
shops to the public but who do not wish to serve same-sex unions.

7 Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning ofSymbolic Speech Under the FirstAmendment, 21 UCLA L. REV.
29, 36 (1973) ("[A]s an irreducible minimum, [expressive conduct] must constitute a communication....
[which] in turn, implies both a communicator and a communicatee . . . .").
78 Strictly speaking, given the free flow of information stmnd of free speech jurisprudence, perhaps the
speaker's intent is not required. Nevertheless, because these cases are usually brought by speakers making an
autonomy-based claim, it makes sense to require that the claimant has an intent to communicate.
An analysis that becomes too individualized also loses some of the benefits of a more rule-based
approach.
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II. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT: BAKERS

This Part examines the social meaning of a bakery providing a cake for a
wedding. Assuming that there is no written message iced onto the cake, is it
nonetheless expressive? If it is, does it communicate what religious objectors
claim-approval of customers or their event? If so, what is it about baking a
cake that conveys this message? To help pinpoint exactly why baking a cake
might be expressive and what it may express, I will examine variations of the
basic act of selling a cake. Ultimately, I conclude that whatever the vendor
who is covered by public accommodations laws may communicate by baking
and selling a wedding cake, it is not approval or disapproval of the people who
buy it or of the event at which it is eaten. In other words, barring some unusual
circumstances, the religious bakers do not have a colorable free speech claim.
A.

Variations on SocialMeaning

As an initial matter, this analysis focuses on the social meaning of
providing a cake rather than refusing to provide it. The complaints make clear
that the wedding industry objectors believe there is something expressive about
baking a cake or taking pictures for a wedding, and that is why they are
religiously opposed to doing it. In particular, they argue that it signals approval
of a union that their religion condemns. The bakers feel that "compelling them
to prepare a cake for a same-sex wedding is equivalent to forcing them to
'speak' in favor of same-sex weddings."80 Similarly, the owners of Elane
Photography said that taking pictures of a same-sex wedding would "require
them to create expression conveying messages that conflict with their religious
beliefs.""'

80 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at *3 (Colo. Office of Admin. Cts. Dec. 6,
2013) (initial decision); see also Yvonne Man, Same-Sex Couple Denied Cake by Bakery, Owners Speak Out,

Fox 59 (Mar. 14, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://fox59.com/2014/03/14/same-sex-couple-denied-cake-by-bakeryowners-speak-out/ ("When asked to do a cake for an occasion or with a theme that's in opposition with our
faith? It's just hard for us. We struggle with that."); Why Some Wedding Businesses Say "IDon't" to Gay
Couples, supra note 5 ("I actually feel like I'm taking part in the wedding. Part of me goes to the reception.
And in this case, that part of me doesn't want to be represented in a ceremony that I believe is unbiblical.").
81 Robert Barnes, Case Weighing Religious Freedom Against Rights of Others is Headed to Supreme
Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.wasingtonpost.com/politics/case-weighing-religious-freedom

-against-rights-of-others-is-headed-to-supreme-court/2014/03/02/88de86d4-al98-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_
story.html.
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1. SocialMeaning of a Sale
To understand the social meaning of a cake sale, imagine a slightly
different sale. Instead of a religious bake shop owner, imagine a religious linen
shop owner who refuses to sell sheets to a same-sex couple. Is selling linen
expressive? The sheet seller might argue that facilitating a same-sex
relationship by selling wedding bed sheets-on which the same-sex couple
will consummate their marriage-is tantamount to endorsing that
consummation. This argument parallels the religious bakers: contrary to their
religious convictions, they are compelled to express approval of same-sex
relationships.
But generally when a store sells goods to a member of the public, that sale
does not communicate any message of endorsement. The social meaning of a
sale by a shop open to all and sundry is limited. It carries no connotation of
endorsing customers or their events. That is, a sale for money in a place of
public accommodation is not expressive conduct.82 If selling sheets conveys no
message of endorsement, then why should selling cakes, flowers, wedding
gowns, or any other item?
2. SocialMeaning ofSale ofMass ProducedItem
One difference is that the baker creates what she sells while the sheet store
owner does not. Thus, it is necessary to consider a transaction that includes
producing as well as selling an item. Perhaps an expressive component lies in
the manufacture if not the sale. Yet, assuming that the seller owns the factory
that makes the sheets, it is not clear that production adds any expressive
component to the overall transaction. Indeed, when an item is mass produced
for retail distribution, it is generally done without specific customers in mind.
3.

SocialMeaning of Sale ofArtisanalItem

If not machine production, perhaps artistic creation communicates
approval. Imagine now that the seller embroiders fanciful borders on the
sheets. Still, even hand-crafted with undeniable artistry, making and selling
artisanal sheets does not really endorse same-sex marriage all that more than
making and selling ordinary sheets.

82 Does money equal speech? Money is considered speech only if it is spent on speech.
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I am not making a high art versus low art distinction, where high art is
expressive and low art is not.8 3 If the scenario were changed to Picasso
refusing to sell one of his paintings to a same-sex couple on their honeymoon
from his open-to-the-public gallery, the conclusion that the sale does not
express approval of the honeymooners or their nuptials would hold.
Instead, what matters is not the type of creative artistry but whether the
creative artistry furthers a message of endorsement.8 4 In general, any link
between the creativity behind embroidery-or baking for that matter-and
endorsement of same-sex marriage is tenuous at best. 5 Assuming there is
something being expressed, it is not approval of same-sex marriage.
4. SocialMeaningofSale of CommissionedArtistic Creation
That conclusion does not change if the artistic item is custom-made for
someone, rather than made beforehand. Arguably, there is a difference between
selling embroidered sheets or wedding cakes that are made before a couple
walks into a shop and making them on commission. The latter involves
providing services as well as wedding goods. Nonetheless, if there is no link
between whatever the creative artistry expresses and endorsement of same-sex
marriage, then it is unlikely that commissioning matters. After all, the
compelled speech complaint (as opposed to the religious facilitation complaint)
is that the business owners are being forced to communicate a message
contrary to their beliefs. If no such message of approval exists, then their free
speech claim should fail.
What if the bakers claim that their free speech rights are abridged merely
because they are forced to create, regardless of message? If this were the
complaint, it might matter whether the vendors created their item for sale
beforehand or created it on commission. If a cake or dress or floral
arrangement existed before a couple walked into their shop, then the wedding

83 I find that problematic for various reasons, among which is that the binary is often gendered.
See, e.g.,
Gill Perry, Introduction: Gender and Art History, in ART AND ITS HISTORIES: GENDER AND ART 8, 24 (Gill
Perry ed., 1999) ("[F]eminist art history has often drawn attention to the separation within patriarchal culture
of a predominately masculine sphere of 'high art' from a more feminine sphere of applied or decorative art, of
embroidery and 'craft."').
84 Cf Laurie Magid, Note, FirstAmendment Protection ofAmbiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467,
493 (1984) ("In applying Spence to ambiguous conduct, a court should ask whether the conduct is relevant to
the actor's message.").
85 The analysis might differ if the seller were asked to embroider "God smiles on this union," or some
other message or decorative motif that itself carried a message of endorsement.
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vendors are never forced to create an item, they are only forced to sell it.86 If
the wedding vendors must make an item on commission specifically for the
couple, on the other hand, then the state compels creative conduct.
However, forced creation, irrespective of message, is not at issue. The
bakers' free speech complaint is that by providing creative services for
same-sex weddings they are essentially forced to endorse same-sex marriage.
Therefore, whether forced creative conduct regardless of the message
communicated implicates free speech is not a question raised by the wedding
vendor cases.
Nonetheless, even if the question were raised, it is not clear that forced
creative conduct, irrespective of message, triggers the Free Speech Clause. It is
true that such conduct has a creative, and therefore arguably expressive,
component. Yet that cannot be enough. As the Supreme Court has observed,
"It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a
person undertakes,"88 including walking down the street. 89 Thus, every action,
including a sale, may have an expressive dimension. 90 There is certainly an
endless list of occupations with a creative element.91 In the wedding industry
alone, creative professionals include-in addition to bakers and
photographers-florists, wedding gown designers, stationers, caterers, party
planners, deejays, singers, and musicians. Yet the mere presence of some
86 An already-existing cake might mean two things. One, it might mean the cake (or bouquet or wedding
gown) is ready for purchase. Or it might mean the design already exists, and the couple selects from a list of a
pre-existing options. If the creative aspect centers around the design, then neither should count as creating
something on commission.
87 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) aff'd, 309 P.3d
53 (N.M. 2013) ("Elane Photography denied Willock's request to photograph the ceremony based upon its
policy of refusing to photograph images that convey the message that marriage can be defined to include
combinations of people other than the union of one man and one woman.").
88 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("It is possible to find some kernel of expression in
almost every activity a person undertakes-for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a
shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.").
89 Id.; see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of "Speech," 1993
Wis. L. REV. 1525, 1550 ("The way a person walks tells us something about her mood. In addition, it
communicates to us that she is walking. It also communicates that she is able to walk.").
90 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1235 (2014) ("[A]ny business's provision of a good or service to someone on an equal
basis with others can always be characterized as expressive. The provision of the good or service expresses the
message, at the least, that the customer is entitled to be treated like any other customer." (emphasis omitted)).
9i Mark Strasser, Speech, Association, Conscience, and the FirstAmendment's Orientation, 91 DENV. U.
L. REV. 495, 525 (2014) ("[A] vast array of individuals providing services can plausibly claim that they are
also engaged in providing artistic or expressive services.").
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expressive or creative component without more cannot suffice to trigger the
Free Speech Clause. Otherwise, virtually all conduct would be expressive
conduct for free speech purposes.92
We need a principled way to distinguish between conduct with an
expressive/creative component that is covered by the Free Speech Clause from
conduct that is not. This Article proposes that compelled expressive conduct
(including compelled creative conduct) is not cognizable as free speech
infringement unless the speaker/creator is forced to communicate a viewpoint
contrary to her own. To be more precise, the speaker must believe that she is
communicating a message that she disagrees with, and the audience must
understand the speaker to be communicating that objectionable message. The
audience need not know that the speaker disagrees with the message, but must
read her conduct as communicating it. The Free Speech Clause protects
expressive conduct from government bans to ensure that the actor is able to
express a particular message. Similarly, the Free Speech Clause should protect
expressive conduct from government compulsion when the actor does not want
to express a particular message. In short, compelled expressive conduct should
trigger free speech scrutiny only when someone is forced by their actions into
conveying a viewpoint they disagree with. 93
Although courts have not generally stated the rule so bluntly, it mostly
aligns with current doctrine. In its compelled speech cases-not even its
compelled expressive conduct cases-the Supreme Court has mostly struck
down laws that forced speakers to articulate an ideological position contrary to
their own.94 "In short, there is no 'generalized right not to speak."' 95
92 It surely would lead to endless challenges to public accommodation laws. Id. at 525 ("Recognizing an
exemption to public accommodations statutes for individuals who perform artistic or expressive conduct would
likely afford such a wide-ranging exemption that the central purpose behind public accommodation laws-the
'elimination of discrimination'-would be severely undermined, if not gutted." (footnote omitted)).
93 Notably, the paradigmatic compelled speech cases with actual speech involve people forced to
articulate messages with which they disagreed. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634
(1943) (holding a compulsory flag salute unconstitutional because it allowed "public authorities to compel [the
plaintiff] to utter what is not in his mind"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding a
mandatory state motto on a license plate unconstitutional because it "forces an individual... [to] foster[]
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable"); cf Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995) (holding that forcing parade organizers to allow an LBGT
group to march in a parade with a banner was unconstitutional because "when dissemination of a view
contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker... the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is
compromised").
94 Compelled expressive conduct cases are rare. But even with compelled speech, the times that the
Supreme Court has found a compelled speech violation usually involved forcing someone to express an
ideological position contrary to their own. See supra note 93 (listing compelled speech cases); see also Pac.
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This proposed rule draws the line between covered and uncovered
compelled expressive conduct at the point where free speech concerns become
salient. In other words, it is drawn at the point where what we think is
problematic about compelled speech comes into play. The three most
commonly articulated free speech goals are (1) to encourage a diverse
marketplace of ideas to help with our search for knowledge;9 6 (2) to facilitate
participatory democracy; 97 and (3) to promote individual autonomy,
self-expression, and self-realization. 98
The free speech goal placed most in jeopardy by compelled speech is
promoting individual autonomy. Forcing someone to speak might compromise
speaker autonomy in various ways: It physically forces someone to speak (or
create) when she would rather stay silent. 99 Worse, it may compel her to
articulate a view with which she disagrees, provoking a clash between her

Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20 (1986) (striking a law that required a company to
carry messages of third parties whose viewpoint clashed with the company's); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding that a state cannot compel nonunion members to pay for a union's
ideological messages as opposed to union-related activities). In contrast, the Court has upheld compelled
speech that lacked this ideological compulsion. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88
(1980) (requiring a mall owner to allow expressive activities on his property did not violate free speech in part
because he was not forced to affirm an ideology with which he disagreed).
There are two exceptions. There is a line of cases involving the right to anonymous speech. In Talley v.
California, the Supreme Court struck down a law requiring disclosure of names and addresses on political
pamphlets, arguing that "[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to
criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). One might
argue that the concern for anonymity might justify triggering free speech scrutiny any time someone is forced
to articulate a viewpoint, even one they agree with. Of course, banning anonymous speech and compelling
speech are not quite the same. The first presents the risk that a speaker unable to speak anonymously decides
to remain silent, and speech is chilled. The second, where a speaker must speak, does not present this same
risk. See injra note 113. In any event, anonymity is not at issue in the wedding vendor challenges.
The one compelled speech case that involved neither viewpoints nor anonymity is an outlier. Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988). In Riley, the Supreme Court struck a law requiring
professional fund-raisers of charities to disclose the percentage of contributions that actually went to charitable
activities. Id.
95 StevenH. Shiffrin, What is Wrong with Compelled Speech?, 29 J.L. & POL. 499, 504 (2014).
96 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MLL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 20-21 (Stefan Collini ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859); see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 119, 130 (1989) (describing the "truth discovery" justification for free speech).
9 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 26-27 (1965); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,
88 CALIF. L. REv. 2353, 2368 (2000).
98 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope ofthe FirstAmendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964,
966 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
9 Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1298 (2014).
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mind and her words.' 00 Worst of all, when someone is forced to speak,
listeners may believe the opinion is the speaker's actual views. 0
Compelled conduct should be a matter of free speech concern only when it
involves the latter two.102 To start, not all infringements on autonomy raise
constitutional issues. The state compels us to do things we might rather not do
all the time. It is inevitable in a society with laws. You might want to stop at a
green light, but traffic laws require you to move.103 Granted the issue here is
not just compelled conduct but compelled expressive conduct. Still, if the main
critique to compelled expressive conduct is that the actors would prefer not to
act rather than that they disagree with the message communicated by the act,
then the actual complaint is not especially different. Therefore, being required
to perform a task is simply not a sufficient infringement on free speech
autonomy, even if it is an expressive task. 04
In contrast, being forced to perform a task that communicates a viewpoint
contrary to your own should raise free speech red flags. 05 Although having
people misattribute that viewpoint to you makes it even worse, misattribution
is not necessary. 106 Instead, it is enough if the state forces you to say something
you disagree with. 107 That is, the government's compulsion should trigger free
speech scrutiny when it creates a clash between what someone believes and
what she must communicate. The fact that an audience understands that it is
not the compelled actor's personal opinion does not mitigate the affront of

100 Id. at 1299.
101 Id at 1299-300.
102 In other words, being forced to act, speak or create when one prefers not to is not enough to trigger
free speech scrutiny.
103 Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 889 (1994) ("Someone
may be 'coerced' by the threat of sanctions to stop at a traffic light. But in another, more relevant sense,
'coercion' connotes the deliberate and wrongful subjecting of one human being to the will of another or
domination that disrespects the other's equal moral worth.").
104 I am of course assuming that another clause besides the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution does
not prohibit the government compulsion.
105 It is the difference between forcing a history student to describe the Pledge of Allegiance and forcing a
student to take the Pledge. Thanks to Aaron Caplan for this distinction.
106 Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette: The
Pledge ofAllegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 434, 457 (Michael C.
Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) (arguing that compelled recitations of substantive views are constitutionally problematic
because they "explicitly manifest indifference to the actual thoughts and judgments of the person required to
speak").
107 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("A system which secures the right to proselytize
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such
concepts.").
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having to express the offending viewpoint in the first place. Such compulsion
"invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control." 08
Obeying traffic laws does not trample on this "sphere of intellect and spirit";
articulating an objectionable viewpoint does. Therefore, even if wedding
vendors have the opportunity to clarify that they do not in fact support
same-sex marriage, any law that compels them to endorse it warrants close
scrutiny. 109

Restricting free speech scrutiny to compelled expressive conduct that
conveys a viewpoint contrary to one's own also makes sense because the other
two free speech concerns-promoting a marketplace of ideas and facilitating
democratic self-government-do not really kick in until then. These two goals
both rely on the free flow of speech, which ensures that the full range of ideas
and information are available for people's search for knowledge and political
decision-making. These aims may be compromised by a discourse that is
distorted by either untrue or confusing speech."1 0 What the wedding vendors
express cannot be described as inaccurate misinformation. It might,
nevertheless, cause confusion: compelled expressive conduct that conveys a
viewpoint the speaker does not hold can distort the discourse by making people
believe a particular opinion is much more popular than it actually is.I In turn,
this mistaken view of a message's popularity "will cause audiences to credit it
more than they would have otherwise, as studies show that the perceived
popularity of a message can increase its persuasiveness."ll 2 This error,
however, occurs only when a speaker is forced to articulate a viewpoint not her
113
own.
My proposed approach would mean that claims of compelled creative
conduct, like any claim of compelled expressive conduct, would not be

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
109 A closer look does not guarantee that the wedding vendors prevail: the requirement might pass
heightened scrutiny if the government's purpose is sufficiently strong and the means sufficiently tailored to
justify the free speech infringement.
110 Corbin, supra note 99, at 1293.
1
Imagine, for example, if all government employees were required to bear specialty license plates
supporting one sports team as opposed to another.
112 Corbin, supra note 99, at 1295.
113 The risk of chill, another free speech worry, is also much reduced. Compelled speech might chill
speech if a speaker decides to cease speaking rather than convey the mandated message. But this risk is small
when the speaker is merely forced to communicate something that comports with her views, or at least is not at
odds with it.
108
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cognizable unless the compelled actors are forced to communicate a message
they find objectionable. If an audience understood the wedding vendors'
compelled conduct as endorsing same-sex marriage-a message that is
anathema to the vendors-then the compulsion would trigger free speech
protections. Without that message, however, compelled conduct, even if
creative, would not.
In this case, a shop providing a service, even a creative service, even on
commission, does not generally convey endorsement of its customers or their
events. Consequently, the wedding bakers' compliance with public
accommodation laws does not merit free speech scrutiny unless there is
something about the context that changes the social meaning of cake-baking by
a bakery open to the public. The next section addresses this possibility.
B. Does Context Change the Analysis?
Even if baking a cake for a wedding does not in general carry expressive
meaning, perhaps the surrounding circumstances overcome that presumption.
After all, social meaning is fluid." 4 Just as destroying a draft card became
expressive when draftees began protesting the Vietnam War, perhaps baking a
cake has likewise taken on expressive meaning in the wake of marriage
equality. Or perhaps there is something about the individual particulars of the
objecting vendors that bolsters their claim that baking a cake for a same-sex
wedding does in fact communicate approval of same-sex marriage.
1.

The Broader Context Argument

Although heretofore providing a service at a business open to the public did
not connote approval, social meaning is not fixed." 5 On the contrary, it is
capable of changing over time. Burning a draft card took on a whole new
meaning during the Vietnam War, as it came to symbolize opposition to an
unpopular war. Perhaps a similar transformation is occurring with regard to
bakers and same-sex weddings.
Two significant cultural events might support this claim. First, business
actions have taken on expressive meaning. At one point, for example, few

114 Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 72, at 954 ("Nor of course are these meanings fixed, or stable, or
uncontested, or uniform across any collection of people. They change, they are contested, and they differ
across communities and individuals.").
115 Id. Nor is social meaning determinant. A confederate flag, for example, has more than one meaning.
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would argue that a for-profit entity with thousands of employees exercised
religion. We usually did not read the business practices of corporations as
potential religious practices. Yet, after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
held that for-profit corporations were persons protected by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act,"l 6 and that providing insurance coverage for
employees could infringe on the company's religious conscience, the social
meaning of certain business practices has changed. Given the recognition of
free exercise implications of corporate actions, perhaps we ought to rethink the
free speech implications of for-profit activity generally. In particular, we may
be witnessing a shift in the meaning of for-profit wedding services.
Second, these cases are occurring against the backdrop of a major surge in
LBGT rights. In the United States, same-sex unions are a relatively new
phenomenon," 8 and the widespread availability of same-sex marriage more
recent still. No state recognized same-sex marriages until 2003.119 When the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor in 2013, same-sex marriage
was available in only twelve states and the District of Columbia.120 Within two
years of the ruling, thirty-seven states and Washington, D.C. allowed gay
couples to marry.121 Finally, in its 2015 Obergefell v. Hodges ruling, the
Supreme Court declared that the U.S. Constitution requires marriage
equality.1 22 Public opinion has likewise undergone a sea change: support for

116 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) ("[W]e hold that a federal regulation's restriction on the activities of a
for-profit closely held corporation must comply with RFRA.").
117 To the extent that owners of public accommodation businesses make similar complaints outside the
context of the wedding industry, one could point to the growing equality of the LBGT community outside the
context of marriage equality.
118 Strictly speaking, legally recognized same-sex unions are fairly recent. Same-sex couples have existed
throughout our history. See, e.g., RODGER STREITMATTER, OUTLAW MARRIAGES: THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF
FIFTEEN EXTRAORDINARY SAME-SEX COUPLES (2012).
119 Massachusetts, or rather the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, made same-sex marriage legal in
2003. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973-74 (Mass. 2003). Although the Supreme Court
of Hawaii had held that denying marriage to same-sex couples violated the state's Equal Protection Clause in
1993, the case was remanded and the state soon amended its constitution to ban same-sex marriages. HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23; Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59-67 (Haw. 1993), as clarifiedon reconsideration(May 27,
1993).
120 133 S. Ct 2675, 2689 (2013) ("New York, in common with, as of this writing, 11 other States and the
District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to marry and so live with pride in
themselves and their union and in a status of equality with all other married persons.").
121 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html.
122 135 S. Ct 2584, 2604-05 (2015). The Court held that
the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may
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marriage equality, which hovered around 37% in 2005, reached 60% in
2015.123 Given this context, perhaps we need to reconsider the meaning of
providing services to same-sex weddings. If conduct that was not expressive
became so when protesting a significant political issue like war, perhaps
conduct that was not previously expressive becomes so when protesting a
significant cultural change like LBGT rights.
However, just because the social meaning of an act can change does not
mean it already has changed. The social meaning of a wedding vendor sale has
not yet morphed into approval of the customers or events served, and courts
should not abet any such change. Courts, like the law more generally, reflect
and influence social meaning.1 24 Although social meaning sometimes changes
independently of courts, other times a court decision can play a role in that
shift.125 Burning a draft card came to represent political protest without the
courts, and arguably, despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to acknowledge it
in O'Brien. The same undeniable change has not yet taken place with regard to
services to same-sex weddings. At most, the social meaning is in flux.
Moreover, courts should reject a change in the social meaning of public
accommodation services. One reason to resist any shift in meaning is that it
gives businesses a powerful tool to avoid government regulation. Multiple
commentators have already noted the way in which companies have used free
speech to curtail the government's ability to regulate in the public interest.1 26

not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry.
Id.
123 Marriage, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/I17328/Marriage.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2015)
(showing that 60% of respondents in May 2015 believed that same-sex marriage should be "recognized by law
as valid," up from 37% just ten years prior); see also George Gao, Most Americans Now Say Learning Their
Child Is Gay Wouldn't Upset Them, PEW RES. CTR. (June 29, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/06/29/most-americans-now-say-leaming-their-child-is-gay-wouldnt-upset-them/ (reporting that the
percentage of Americans who would not be upset if their child came out as gay or lesbian shifted from just 9%
in 1985 to 57% in 2015).
124 Cf Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 72, at 949-50 ("Some social meanings are constructed; some
are constructed by government.").
125 For example, whether the state endorsed the message on specialty license plates was an open question,
as some courts had classified such speech as private speech and others as government speech. If the plates
were private speech, that militated against a conclusion that the state endorsed the message on the specialty
license plate. After the Supreme Court ruled that specialty license plates were government speech in Walker v.
Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., it will be difficult to argue that the state is not endorsing
the message of those license plates. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015).
126 See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,
117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 233 (2014) ("In several leading cases, conservative judges have used the First
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Previous commercial litigants, however, have targeted regulations of business
advertising,127 disclosures, 12
and other word-based regulations,129 not
nonverbal conduct that might be expressive. The attempt to transform the
commercial practices of for-profit businesses into expressive conduct protected
by the Free Speech Clause is new. This push builds upon Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., which imbued for-profit corporate practices with religious
meaning.1 30 The criticisms of Hobby Lobby are legion.131 Among them is that
recognizing corporate religious liberty rights has helped resurrect Lochner-era
libertarianism under the guise of First Amendment protections.132

Amendment in a libertarian manner to invalidate regulations that reflected liberal or progressive values.");
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment. A PreliminaryExploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1794 (2004) ("Similarly, objections to government regulation of business
that were originally based on concern for economic liberty have become objections to the regulation of
commercial advertising.. . ."); Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story. Country of Origin Labeling and the First
Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 25 (2015) ("Objections having little to do with free speech at their heart
are channeled into First Amendment challenges in U.S. law both because of the rhetorical force of free speech
claims and because, relatedly, the First Amendment is much more likely to invalidate legislation than many
other rights . . . .").
127 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking ban on billboard
advertisements near schools and playgrounds); Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291 (4th
Cir. 2013) (striking ban on alcohol advertisements in college newspapers); Valley Broad. Co. v. United States,
107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating federal ban on broadcast advertisement of casino gambling); cf
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (invalidating a requirement that graphic
warning labels be included on tobacco advertising and packaging), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't
ofAgric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
128 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking on free speech grounds
SEC rule requiring companies to report whether minerals and mineral products are "conflict-free"), overruled
byAm. MeatInst., 760 F.3d 18; Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking on
free speech grounds NLRB rule requiring that "[a]ll employers subject to the NLRA must post notices to
employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of their NLRA rights . . . ." (alteration in original)),
overruled by Am. MeatInst, 760 F.3d 18; United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking on
free speech grounds an FDA regulation barring promotion of drug's off-label uses).
129 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (striking a law which restricted the sale,
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors); Thompson
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (invalidating FDA rule that exempted compounded drugs from
FDA approval requirements if makers did not advertise or promote them).
i30 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). While strictly speaking Hobby Lobby was decided under the RFRA rather than
the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA protects the same interests.
131 See generally Caroline Mala Coibin, CorporateReligious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 279
(2015); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RPRA Exemptions fom the Contraception
Mandate. An UnconstitutionalAccommodation ofReligion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); Seema
Mohapatra, Time to Lift the Veil ofInequality in Health-Care Coverage. Using CorporateLaw to Defend the
Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137, 138 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the
Birth of CorporateConscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POLY & L. 303, 304 (2014).
132 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015). During the
Lochner era, the Supreme Court regularly struck down labor laws designed to protect employees on the
grounds that they interfered with the employer's (and employee's) right to contract. Id. The Court, whose
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Similar concerns are at stake here.1 33 The latest incarnation of the
Lochner-esque revival is particularly worrisome because corporations are
challenging on First Amendment grounds regulations designed to protect the
less powerful. In Hobby Lobby, a corporation used religious rights to avoid
compliance with employment protection law.1 34 Infusing employer-employee
relations with religious significance has increased the power of already
powerful employers over their employees.1 35 With wedding vendors, it is
public accommodation law.1 36 Granting free speech significance to the
provision of wedding services makes customers belonging to historically
subordinated groups more vulnerable to discrimination. Nor are wedding
vendors the only religious objectors likely to bring free speech claims. 137 if
their sales create a cognizable free speech claim, then why not sales by other
vendors, or other conduct by other businesses? 38

decisions were informed by social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics, assumed that the status quo was
natural and pre-political, and that therefore government should not interfere with it. Id. Although long reviled,
Lochner-style thinking has been making a comeback. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of
Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 569 (2015) ("In the last decade, however, a new wave of libertarian
scholars-operating closer to the mainstream of conservative legal thought-has argued anew for a revival of
Lochner's aggressive scrutiny for regulations that interfere with economic liberty.")
133 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 90, at 1239 ("[JI]f the Supreme Court holds that secular, for-profit
corporations have religious rights against the application of the ACA under RFRA, it is avery short leap to say
that those corporations have speech and associational rights against the application of public accommodations
laws under the First Amendment." (emphasis omitted)).
134 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776.
135 See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafly Case That Threatens Women's Rights and
Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641, 641 (2015) ("In the name of religious freedom, the
Supreme Court authorized the Green family, the Christian owners of the Hobby Lobby corporation, to impose
their religious faith upon their female employees through force of law."); Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of
Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POLY
REV. 63, 64 (2015) (noting "how much more value the Hobby Lobby Court gave to the religious concerns of
employers than to the religious freedoms of their employees").
136 Earlier constitutional challenges to the public accommodation laws of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
were grounded in freedom of contract, association, and involuntary servitude. Bagenstos, supra note 90, at
1214-17. They were all rejected by the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 260-62 (1964).
137 See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (listing examples of business owners refusing to serve
the LBGT community); cf Claire Galofaro & Adam Beam, Same-Sex MarriageFight Turns to Clerks Who
Refuse Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/4d7dbl43743145
a0a58530c7b88fad2a/same-sex-marriage-fight-tums-clerk-who-refuse-licenses
(reporting that some judges
and clerks in Alabama and Texas have in the name of religious liberty and free speech ordered their offices "to
issue no marriage licenses at all").
138 In fact, recognition of free speech rights in this type of case might actually serve as a more powerful
sword than religious rights, since it can be wielded by any objector with strong viewpoints (which is basically
everybody), not just religiously devout objectors. Store owners, for example, might claim their overwhelming
patriotism prevents them from selling items to undocumented immigrants lest it endorse illegal immigration.
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To hold that the wedding vendors' conduct has an expressive component
protected by the Free Speech Clause might also undermine free speech
doctrine. It greatly expands what counts as expressive conduct, and an overly
broad understanding of expressive conduct risks nullifying the distinction
between covered "speech" and uncovered "conduct." Although some critics
have insisted on the futility of the speech-conduct distinction especially vis-avis expressive conduct,1 39 free speech

jurisprudence

needs it.' 40 Otherwise,

either all expressive conduct potentially triggers the Free Speech Clause, or
none does.
A very expansive category also risks diluting potential protection for that
category. Often, "The more broadly rights are drawn, the more difficult it
becomes to enforce those rights stringently."' 4' Because a broader right is
more disruptive, it creates incentives to lessen its impact: "If every act
becomes a potentially protected free speech act, then the test to measure its
constitutionality may well weaken." 42 In short, although the social meaning of

While it is true that the current wedding vendors have all been religious, future ones might not be. Granted,
perhaps only religious business owners would feel strongly enough to bring suit, but that seems unlikely. It is
also possible that the courts are more open to the claims of religious objectors, though granting religious views
more protection than other views is itself a free speech problem, as free speech is supposed to protect all views
equally, no matter their popularity.
139 See Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term Foreword On DrawingLines, 82 HARV. L. REV.
63, 79 (1968) ("A constitutional distinction between speech and nonspeech has no content.... Speech is
conduct, and actions speak."); injra Part III.B.3.b.iii (describing approach that assumes distinction between
speech and conduct is incoherent and therefore focuses on government's motive).
140 See, e.g, STANLEY FISH, THERE Is No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too
105 (1994) ("The distinction [between speech and conduct] is essential because no one would think to frame a
First Amendment right that began 'Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of action,' for that would
amount to saying 'Congress shall make no law. . . .'); cf Amy Adler, Inverting the FirstAmendment, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 921, 973 (2001) ("Although several scholars have contested the usefulness, as well as the
accuracy, of this distinction as a tool for explaining the First Amendment, the problem of dividing speech from
action consumes a significant part of case law and scholarship." (footnote omitted)).
141 William P. Marshall, Diluting ConstitutionalRights. Rethinking "Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw. U.
L. REV. 558, 567 (1985). This is especially true given that free speech claims are increasingly brought by
businesses rather than actual people. Cf John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the FirstAmendment.
History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223-24 (2015) (noting that "corporations have
increasingly displaced individuals as direct beneficiaries of First Amendment rights").
142 MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION
782 (3d ed. 2011) ("There may be . . a kind of inverse relation between coverage and protections. They are
like taffy: The wider we stretch the meaning of 'speech,' the thinner the barrier between us and the
government."); see also Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 837 (2004) ("Nonetheless, the
danger may be inherent in every attempt to expand a right, for at some point, as the definition of a right is
enlarged, there are likely to be reasons for qualifying access."). Professor Hamburger argues that free exercise
protection suffered this fate: "[W]hen the right of free exercise of religion came to be defined broadly, it was
rendered conditional on government interests." Id
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a commercial sale is capable of changing, we should resist this particular shift
in understanding.
2.

The Specific Individual Context Argument

The bakers might respond that the social meaning should be informed not
only by the general social context but also their individualized context. Even if
wedding services provided by businesses open to the public may not in general
carry expressive connotations, if the individual vendor made a point of picking
and choosing who they serve, and has only ever served couples who conform
to their ideal of Christian marriage, the meaning of a cake or photograph may
be different for them in particular, regardless of the wider social meaning of
baking a wedding cake or taking a wedding photograph.
Conduct that is not generally considered expressive may become imbued
with meaning due to circumstances. Chewing gum is generally not expressive.
But after a principal suspends from school a black student but not a white
student for the exact same chewing gum infraction, gum-chewing may take on
meaning-understood by its audience-when students do it at a protest the
next day. Could the creation of a wedding cake undergo the same
transformation?
At the very least, for baking a cake to express approval, bakers would have
to limit their services to customers and events they screen and support. As a
factual matter, however, it is uncertain whether any plaintiff can actually make
this showing.1 43 None has claimed that they check every client for conformity
to their religious beliefs and regularly turn away those who fall short. Indeed, it
is unclear whether any wedding vendor has refused any customers besides gay
ones,1 44 such as couples who are atheists or who have engaged in extra-marital
sex or other activities that clash with their religious convictions. 45 The dearth
of such evidence weakens their argument that their participation in a wedding
143 Elane Photography states that it refuses to take any photographs that present abortion, pornography,
nudity, or polygamy in a favorable light. James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation AntiDiscriminationLaws Take Aim at FirstAmendment Freedom ofSpeech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 979 (2011).
However, given that they specialize in weddings, with a sideline of engagement and family portraits, they are
not likely to encounter (nor have they claimed to have encountered) requests to photograph anything related to
these themes. Id. at 978-79.
144 While the Huguenins did decline to document the making of a horror film, they have not claimed that
they check every client for compliance with their religious beliefs and regularly turn away those who do not.
Id. at 979.
145 It is possible, but probably unlikely, that they do not condemn extra-marital sex. Indeed, it is hard to
believe that the only tenet of their religion that matters is the gender of wedding partners.
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indicates approval of that marriage, especially since they must overcome the
presumption that commercial sales do not convey endorsement. 146
Nor is it clear whether careful vetting for compliance with religious beliefs
is even possible in a place of public accommodation. Such screening is
generally incompatible with operating a shop that anyone can enter. By
definition, places of public accommodation are open to the general public.
(That non-selectivity helps create the presumption that places of public
accommodation convey no message of endorsement of their customers when
they provide a service, even if that service is expressive.) Moreover, part of the
wedding vendors' individualized circumstances is that they have opted to run a
business open to the public, as opposed to one that took only referrals.1 47
Of course, the foregoing assumes that courts should look to such
individualized particulars as opposed to social meaning. Social meaning, even
when informed by local events,148 is readily available to audiences; specific
practices of individual shops are not. The chewing gum incident would likely
be well-known to the relevant audience, unlike the sales policy of each store in

146 Howard M. Friedman, Why Do You Speak That Way? Symbolic Expression Reconsidered,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 589 (1988) ("[I]t is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in
assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies." (quoting Clark v. Cmty
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984))); cf Magid, supra note 84, at 492 ("Because
sleeping is an ambiguous activity-that is, it can have an ordinary or a communicative purpose-the indicia of
observer understanding must be particularly persuasive to overcome the strong presumption that sleeping, like
other common activities, has no communicative purpose.").
147 Part of the individualized context is also that they live in a location with a public accommodation law
that bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The very fact that the law forbids them from
discriminating makes the social meaning of service at least ambiguous. If a decision to serve a same-sex
wedding were completely voluntary, it might be easier to attach meaning to it. Once it becomes mandatory, the
decision to serve could just as easily be read as expressing the desire to obey the law rather than the desire to
approve same-sex marriage. This ambiguity arguably did not exist in the chewing gum example. Thus, for
audiences, at most, the meaning of the wedding vendors' conduct is ambiguous. Cf Lessig, Social Meaning,
supra note 72, at 966.
In a context where there is no legal proscription against discrimination, the act of hiring or serving
a black had a relatively unambiguous meaning-either a special favor for blacks or greed for
money. But if that context were changed such that discrimination against blacks was illegal, then
at the least, the decision to hire a black would have an ambiguous meaning. The businessman
could be hiring or serving a black because of his concern for the status of blacks, or he could be
hiring or serving blacks because of his concern to obey the law. By creating this important
ambiguity, the law would function to reduce the symbolic costs of hiring blacks.
Id
148 Recall that social meaning may be community-specific. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text
(defining social meaning).
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town. Most people at a wedding, for example, could not name the wedding
cake's bakery, never mind describe its service history. To assume that the
audience's understanding of baking a cake is informed by major local events is
one thing; to assume it is informed by the individual decisions of storeowners
might go too far. 149

'

Even assuming such individualized decisions are taken into account, in the
bakers' case they fail to rebut the presumption that a sale is just a sale and not a
message of approval. Moreover, as already discussed, there are good reasons to
resist reading the baking of a wedding cake for a couple as approval of their
marriage. In addition to the concerns expressed earlier about reviving Lochner
and wreaking havoc in free speech jurisprudence, such a reading would risk
nullifying public accommodation law. After all, the arguments advanced by the
bakers are not limited to wedding vendors. They could apply to any place of
public accommodation. That is, any place open to the public that is somewhat
selective in whom they serve would be able to argue that, like the bakers,
providing goods or services equals endorsement of the people and event
served, and therefore is expressive conduct whose regulation triggers free
speech scrutiny. Every single transaction in every store, hotel, 5 0 restaurant,' 5
bowling alley,1 52 doctor's office,1 53 day care center,

5 4

auto repair shop, 5 5

149 Magid, supra note 84, at 481 ("The question in the hard cases of ambiguous conduct is not whether to
apply Spence, but rather what contextual factors in a given case can and should be relevant in determining if
the conduct is designed and perceived as expression." (emphasis omitted)).
150 See, e.g., Billy Hallowell, Lesbian Couple Wins DiscriminationLawsuit Against Religious Bed and
Breakfast Owner Who Denied Them a Room, BLAZE (Apr. 16, 2013, 7:07 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/
stories/2013/04/16/lesbian-couple-wins-discrimination-lawsuit-against-religious-bed-and-breakfast-ownerwho-denied-them-a-room/.
151 See, e.g., Chris Ramirez, LGBT Group Claims NM Denny's Denied Service, Used Homophobic Slurs,
KOB4 (Feb. 10, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.kob.com/article/stories/s3694403.shtml (reporting that a waitress
in New Mexico refused to serve "fags and faggots"); Arizona Lesbian Couple Told to 'Get a Room' by
RestaurantManagerAfter Kissing DuringAnniversary Dinner, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 12:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/arizona-lesbian-couple-kiss-restaumnt
n 1310737.html.
152 See, e.g., Gay Plano Couple Asked to Leave Family Fun Center, Told They Are Not Family,'
DALLASVOICE.COM (Jan. 8, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.dallasvoice.com/gay-plano-couple-told-not-familyasked-leave-main-event-10 136107.html.
153 See, e.g., N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cty. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959
(Cal. 2008) (rejecting doctors' claim that providing fertility treatment to a lesbian violated their religious
rights); see also Tresa Baldas, PediatricianWouldn't Carefor Baby with 2 Moms, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb.
19, 2015, 6:46 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/maconb/2015/02/18/discriminationbirth/23640315/.
154 Joey Garrison, Davidson Academy Turns down Children Because ParentsAre Gay, TENNESSEAN (Jan.
23, 2015, 10:52 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2015/01/22/gay-nashville-brian-copelanddavidson-academy/22170797/; Hailey Heinz, Child with Gay Parents Can't Enroll at School,
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taxicab,1 56 and more would potentially implicate the Free Speech Clause.
Indeed, the reasoning could apply to other conduct as well-such as providing
housing, employment, or education-thereby making other anti-discrimination
laws subject to free speech challenges. Ultimately, neither the general nor
individual context provides sufficient reason to reinterpret the social meaning
of providing wedding services, and many reasons caution against it.

In analyzing the conduct versus speech distinction in the context of services
provided by businesses open to the public, it would appear that conducting a
commercial transaction is ultimately conduct. That is, barring some explicit
message of approval, 5 7 the sale of a cake, even if created with genuine artistry,
even if commissioned, does not equate to compelled endorsement of the
customer or her event. Furthermore, even if its social meaning is capable of
changing, we should resist reading a shop's sale as endorsement. Otherwise the
speech-conduct distinction could be rendered meaningless and every
transaction could become subject to a free speech challenge. 58 In short, we
should conclude, as one court did, that "[the bakers] have no free speech right
to refuse because they were only asked to bake a cake, not make a speech." 59
III. CONDUCT PLUS EXPRESSION: PHOTOGRAPHERS

Challenges by wedding photographers present two potential differences.
First, as opposed to wedding cakes, perhaps wedding photographs do
communicate approval of same-sex marriage. After all, in contrast to cakes,

ALBUQUERQUE J. (July 28, 2012, 1:03 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/07/28/news/child-withgay-parents-cant-enroll-at-school.htmil.
155 Faith Karimi, Michigan Auto Repair Shop Says Yes to Gun Owners, No to Homosexuals, CNN (Apr.
12, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/17/us/micigan-business-bans-openly-gay-people/.
156 Gay Chicago Couple Says a Kiss Got Them Kicked out of a Taxi Cab, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 3,
2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/02/gay-chicago-cab-kiss- n 3375104.html; Oregon
Cab Driver Who Refused Lesbian Couple Service Loses Permit, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2013, 2:22 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 13/08/22/oregon-gay-cab-driver-permit n 3796604.html; James Michael
Nichols, Houston Gay Couple Allegedly Kicked Out of Cab for Kissing, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2014,
3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/15/gay-couple-kissing-taxi n_5983 188.html.
157 Part II assumed no written messages on the cake.
158 Note that Hobby Lobby, which recognized facilitation as a substantial burden on for-profit entities, has
already cleared the way for free exercise challenges to anti-discrimination laws.
159 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at *9 (Colo. Office of Admin.
Cts. Dec. 6,
2013) (initial decision).
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they depict the actual wedding.1 60 Second, unlike the bakers' cakes, the
photographers' compelled work product-photographs-have long been
recognized as speech. Do either of these differences mean that taking
photographs for a same-sex wedding should trigger free speech scrutiny? I will
address each potential difference in turn.
A.

Wedding Photographsas EndorsementofSame-Sex Marriage

The first question is whether photographs of a same-sex wedding
communicate the photographer's endorsement of that wedding. Part II argued
that the provision of a service by a place of public accommodation does not
equate to approval of customers or their event. This section investigates
whether that analysis still holds if the service is a picture of those customers or
their event.161 It argues that notwithstanding the wedding photographers' claim
that the personal artistic choices they make translate into endorsing the
wedding depicted, creative decisions do not automatically read as approval,
especially when the public accommodations context neutralizes any potential
endorsement.
The wedding photographers argue that requiring them to photograph a
same-sex wedding forces them to endorse the wedding because "the artistic
choices [made] regarding their photographs influence not only the power, but
also the meaning of the message conveyed." 62 As anyone who has ever had
their picture taken with their mouth full can testify, artistic decisions can
influence the message conveyed by a photograph. There certainly is no
gainsaying the creativity involved in taking a picture. The timing, lighting,
perspective, and composition are all creative decisions that may affect the final

160 Another difference is that, unlike bakers, photographers attend the wedding. That is, photographers
provide their service at the wedding while bakers fulfill their service obligations at the bakeshop. In fact, this
distinction is not a sharp one. Bakers usually bring and set up the cake at the wedding venue, while much of
the photographers' work is done at the studio. In any event, although their presence may bear on a religious
claim of forced participation, it is less relevant for deciding a forced speech claim. The issue, after all, is
whether their photography communicates endorsement of same-sex marriages. The more relevant distinction is
that wedding photographs depict the same-sex union while wedding cakes do not.
161 The argument that artists necessarily endorse any event portrayed in their art is also unavailing. First,
as discussed, these are artists running a business open to the public, not artists working independently who
decide what they want to depict. Moreover, it is a fallacy that artists only portray scenes they admire and
approve. For example, photojournalists would never make that claim.
162 Brief of Wedding Photographers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Elane Photography,
LLCv. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (No. 13-585).
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image.1 63 There is also cropping, color correction, and other modifications that
happen in post-production.1 64 For example, Elane Photography explained, "By
cropping out a playful look on the face of a young child standing behind a
kissing couple, Ms. Huguenin singlehandedly transforms a picture's message
from humor to romance."l65
In attempting to take pictures that will please clients, the professional
photographer will no doubt end up depicting a same-sex wedding in a positive
light instead of a negative one.166 For some this is equivalent to endorsing the
positively portrayed scene.1 67 As one commentator observed, "If Huguenin
actively formed the content of the photograph through her artistic manipulation
of the medium, then the photograph likely contained her own expressive
interpretation of the scene." 68
But just because the photographer has communicated something, it does
not mean it is her approval of same-sex marriage. Perhaps all that is
communicated by flattering photographs is the photographer's professionalism.
As with most professions, wedding photography has certain standards. These
standards transcend any particular client or event, and a professional
photographer is expected to meet them regardless of the scene portrayed.
Consequently, satisfying those minimal requirements is less about personal
expression and more about professional competence. Whatever emotion is
conveyed, the photographer need not share it. Thus, a joyful wedding scene
depicts the couple's joy, not the photographer's.1 69 A photographer may well

163 See itd at 15; Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 501 ("And, as an excellent amicus brief by wedding
photographers detailed in Willock, the artistry of wedding photographers is far from trivial.").
164 Brief of Wedding Photographers, supra note 162, at 7.
165 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5 n.2, Elane Photography v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014)
(No. 13-585).
166 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 63 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014). Elane Photography "creates and edits photographs for its clients so as to tell a positive story about each
wedding it photographs, and the company and its owners would prefer not to send a positive message about
same-sex weddings or same-sex marriage." Id.
167 Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale: The Threat of State Public Accommodations Laws to the First
Amendment Rights ofArtistic Businesses, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515, 1533 (2012) ("Requiring a photographer,
on pain of civil sanction, to portray certain events in a positive light that she believes should not be so
portrayed is essentially forcing her to support or adopt an idea not her own.").
168 id
169 Brief of Amici Curiae Steven H. Shiffrin & Michael C. Dorf Supporting Respondent at 31-32, Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33,687), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014)
("[A]lthough the company is required under New Mexico law to photograph the ceremony in a way that meets
professional standards, conveying joy, emotion, romance, and love within the ceremony, nothing in the record
suggests that the company contests that same sex ceremonies lack these qualities and therefore, the compelled
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be a storyteller, as an amicus brief written by wedding photographers argues,
70
but the story told is about the day that two people wed,o
not about the
7
photographer's endorsement of same-sex marriage.' ' In short, photos capture
what the couple is feeling, and "say nothing about the proper way to interpret
the Bible and nothing about . .. childrearing." 72
Even assuming that some creative decisions reflect the photographer's
personal view, portraying a same-sex wedding positively still should not
automatically read as endorsement of same-sex marriage. First, the message
communicated by the wedding photographs is not altogether clear. In other
compelled speech cases, the message was not ambiguous. The link between the
Pledge of Allegiance and honoring the flag is clear,1 73 as is the message in
New Hampshire's state motto "Live Free or Die."'7 These examples both
involved verbal messages, which are less likely to be ambiguous. 's For
example, in another cake refusal case, a customer requested a Bible-shaped
cake with "God hates sin. Psalm 45:7" and "Homosexuality is a detestable sin.
Leviticus 18:22" written on it, accompanied by a picture of two grooms
holding hands with a large red X over them.1 76 The link between the Bible
verses and a message of condemnation of gay people is clear. 1 The link

expression does not clash with the company's expressed beliefs."); Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 506 (arguing that
at most "she must photograph a conuitment ceremony in ways that capture the celebration's emotional,
loving, romantic, and joyful aspects, but the record does not suggest it is any part of her views (including her
religious or public policy views) that same-sex conuitment ceremonies do not contain these aspects").
170 Brief of Wedding Photographers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Elane Photography,
LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct 1787 (2014) (No. 13-585) ("The goal of a wedding photojournalist is to 'tell the
whole story of the day."' (quoting GLEN JOHNSON, DIGITAL WEDDING PHOTOGRAPHY: CAPTURING BEAUTIFUL
MEMORIES 19 (Wiley 2006))).
171 The wedding photographers attempt to bolster their case by comparing wedding photographers to
tattoo artists. Brief of Wedding Photographers, supra note 162, at 28-29. Like wedding photography, tattooing
is a deeply creative and expressive endeavor. Id. At the same time, few would look at a tattoo of a heart with
"mom" written in it and think that the tattoo artist loves the inked person's mother.
172 Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 507.
173 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626, 632-33 (1943).
174 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 n.2 (1977).
175 Of course, writing does not guarantee clarity. In Morse v. Frederick, the meaning of a student's banner
proclaiming "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" is accurately described as "cryptic." 551 U.S. 393, 397, 401 (2007). The
school principal thought it promoted illegal drug use; the student argued it was mere nonsense. Id. at 401-02.
176 Alan Gathright & Eric Lupher, Denver's Azucar Bakery Wins Right to Refuse to Make Anti-Gay
Cakes, 7NEws DENVER (Apr. 23, 2015, 7:43 PM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/
denvers-azucar-bakery-wins-right-to-refuse-to-make-anti-gay-cake. Although the baker agreed to make the
cake, she refused to write the requested words. Id. The baker also offered to provide a pastry bag and icing so
the customer could write the messages himself Id.
177 Moreover, the Bible verses clarify the meaning of another picture-the two groomsmen with a large
red X over them-in case the message conveyed by being X'ed out was not itself sufficiently clear.
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between pictures of a same-sex wedding and a message of approval of
same-sex marriage is not quite as obvious. Whatever link exists cannot
compare to the link between the hate cake's Bible verses and its message, or
even the message conveyed by an image of a same-sex wedding couple with a
big X over it. Then again, even if the wedding photographs were accompanied
by a big check or thumbs up, what exactly would be endorsed? The happiness
of two people, or that the institution of marriage should extend to them? 78
Second, perhaps the artistic choices that express approval (assuming some
choices do read as approval) have to predominate in order to trigger protection
as expressive conduct, and perhaps they fail to do so with wedding
photographs. Well-done lighting and thoughtful composition, while creative
and crucial to the final image, do not necessarily communicate endorsement of
same-sex marriage. Of course, deciding which creative aspects
"predominate"-those that contribute to a message of endorsement versus
those that do not-may be a mare's nest.1 79
Third, the context of being a photograph taken by a studio that qualifies as
a public accommodation likely neutralizes any message of endorsement, at
least when that endorsement is uncertain.' 80 The commercial, public
accommodation context was certainly decisive for the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Elane Photography, which rejected a free speech claim by a

178 Presumably one can be happy for a couple without endorsing all their choices. I can be thrilled that
two friends have wed while disagreeing with the tenets of the church where they married.
179 It may even be a cousin to deciding whether the speech or conduct aspect in expressive conduct
"predominates." See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17-18 (1970);
THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20 (1966). Emerson's
approach was severely criticized by many who argued that it was impossible to separate out the speech and
conduct aspects. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, FlagDesecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975) (arguing that burning a draft
card was "100% action and 100% expression"); cf Henkin, supra note 139, at 79 ("A constitutional distinction
between speech and nonspeech has no content. . . . Speech is conduct, and actions speak."). At the same time,
some First Amendment tests do ask which of two aspects predominates. For example, the Lemon test in
Establishment Clause analysis asks whether there was a predominantly secular or predominantly religious
purpose or effect to challenged government action. Lemony. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
180 Some might go further and argue that the context of a commercial transaction by a place of public
accommodation neutralizes any potential message of endorsement by the service provider-even very clear
ones. In other words, even if icing spells out "same-sex marriage is an abomination," the only conclusion an
audience would draw is that someone asked the baker to write those words. I am making a more limited claim:
when the message itself is unclear-what does the photograph convey about same-sex marriage?-the public
accommodation context suggests that it does not convey any particular viewpoint, and certainly not the
photographer's.
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photography studio that refused to photograph a same-sex commitment
ceremony. 181
While context can imbue an ambiguous display or conduct open to
interpretation with meaning, so too can context drain or minimize it. Just as the
Supreme Court has found that a state-owned Madonna painting should not be
read as endorsing religion in contexts such as an art museum,182 a picture of a
same-sex wedding should not be read as endorsing same-sex marriage in the
context of a hired photography studio that holds itself out as open to the
public.1 83 For the same reason, when Sears photographs a married man and his
mistress (or a married woman and her paramour) in an embrace, we generally
do not view the photograph as endorsing adultery.
If nothing else, we certainly do not view that photograph as Sears's or the
photographer's approval of adultery. Or, as the New Mexico Supreme Court
noted,
Reasonable observers are unlikely to interpret Elane Photography's
photographs as an endorsement of the photographed events. It is well
known to the public that wedding photographers are hired by paying
customers and that a photographer may not share the happy couple's
views on issues ranging from the minor (the color scheme, the hors
d'oeuvres) to the decidedly major (the religious service, the choice of
bride or groom).

84

Thus, the photographers' expressive conduct claim parallels the bakers'
unsuccessful claim. Both weddings vendors complain that they are forced to
endorse marriage equality. 85 But as the trial court concluded, Huguenin's only
message as a paid photographer was "fine photography of special moments." 86

181 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 66 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014) ("It believes that because it is a photography business, it cannot be subject to public accommodation
laws. The reality is that because it is a public accommodation, its provision of services can be regulated, even
though those services include artistic and creative work.").
182 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 742 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Government of the
United States does not violate the Establishment Clause by hanging Giotto's Madonna on the wall of the
National Gallery."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] typical
museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of
endorsement of that content.").
183 Similarly, a wedding photographer taking a picture of a same-sex couple at a synagogue endorses
neither Judaism nor same-sex marriage.
184 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 69-70.
185 Id at 63.
186 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, CV-2008-06632, 2009 WL 8747805, para. 25 (N.M. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2009); see also Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 509 ("It does not force the photographer to endorse
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B. Photographyas Speech
The photographers' case differs from the bakers' for another reason;
photographs, like words, have long been viewed as speech. 8 7 Consequently,
perhaps the expressive conduct analysis is inappropriate. That is, perhaps the
public accommodation law triggers free speech scrutiny not because the
wedding vendors' services amount to expressive conduct but because
photographs are speech. In deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, perhaps
compelling someone to take pictures is akin to compelling someone to write
words, whether they be "God condemns same-sex marriage" or "God supports
same-sex marriage."
If what is at issue is not conduct-which may or may not trigger free
speech protections depending on whether the conduct has a sufficiently
expressive component-but straightforward speech, then should it not be
covered by the Free Speech Clause? In fact, several commentators have
compared Elane Photography to the classic compelled speech casesiss like
Barnette, where public school students were required to pledge allegiance to
the U.S. flag,' 89 and Wooley, where drivers were required to display "Live Free
or Die" license plates.1 90 If the comparison is apt, instead of analyzing the
social meaning of wedding pictures, a court should plunge straight into a
speech analysis. Nonetheless, there are several reasons why wedding
photographs are not comparable to these seminal compelled speech cases.

same-sex commitment ceremonies, and it does not force her to endorse same-sex marriage because, from an
objective perspective, photographers do not endorse the events they photograph.").
187 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) ("[P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and

.

&

engravings . . . have First Amendment protection."); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding
that motion pictures fall within the scope of speech protected by the First Amendment); see also, e.g.,
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHLOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 97 (1982) ("It is not always true that 'one
picture is worth a thousand words', but the fact that this ancient proverb treats the two as different
denominations of the same currency suggests that words and pictures have similarities particularly relevant in
the context of the principle of freedom of speech.").
188 Gottry, supra note 143, at 988-89 ("A more appropriate case to analogize to [ElanePhotography] may
be Wooley v. Maynard. . . ."); Nabet, supra note 167, at 1535-34 (comparing Elane Photography to Barnette
and Wooley); Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 8 N.Y.U. J.L.
LIBERTY 116, 119 (2013) ("This case is largely controlled . . by Wooley v. Maynard. .
18
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
190 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).
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1. Compelled Service Involves Conduct
First, the Elane Photography challenge to New Mexico's public
accommodation law cannot be considered a pure speech case because it
involves conduct as well. The claim is not that taking a photograph involves
conduct. Arguably, so does writing and several other forms of expression
which are nonetheless considered pure speech.191 Rather, the claim is that
providing services is conduct. Therefore, unlike the regulation in Barnette
which on its face ordered speech (the recitation of the Pledge),192 the public
accommodation law in Elane Photography on its face orders conduct (the
provision of services).1 93 Consequently, Elane Photography is not in fact
analogous to Barnette.
While the students in Barnette were required to say something, the
wedding vendors are required to do something. Public accommodations laws
require that businesses that are open to the public, including creative ones,
make their services available to anyone (in a protected category) who requests
them. In short, the law requires that they do not discriminate, which is a
regulation of conduct, not speech. Consequently, Elane Photographycannot be
described as involving pure speech. Thus, even assuming that the law compels
expression, it compels expressive conduct, and therefore would be subject to
the intermediate scrutiny of O 'Brien rather than the strict scrutiny of Barnette
and Wooley.
2. Compelled PhotographsAre Not ProblematicCompelled Expressive
Conduct
Perhaps another reason why wedding photographs do not merit the same
scrutiny as the words in Barnette and Wooley is that pictures are different than
words in free speech jurisprudence. Despite some Supreme Court language to
the contrary, perhaps there exists a free speech hierarchy with verbal

.

191 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 890 (2006) ("[A]ll speech
involves action of some sort (talking, writing, printing, etc.) . .
192 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
193 Id at 628-29. Strictly speaking, the law required students to say the pledge of allegiance (speech) and
salute the flag (conduct). Id. Saluting might nonetheless be considered akin to "pure speech" in the same way
that wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War was in Tinker. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969). In both cases, the only purpose of the conduct was communicative,
and the only effect was due to the communicative impact. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06; Barnette, 319 U.S. at
628-29.
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expression at the top.1 94 Or perhaps words are not considered more worthy, but
merely more clear. That is, perhaps words are more protected because they are
easier to read. If, as suggested earlier,1 95 compelled expressive conduct only
becomes problematic when the speaker is forced to sponsor a message or point
of view with which she disagrees,1 96 that is more likely to happen with words
than photographs because words are generally less ambiguous. To wit,
compelled speech claims might be weaker with images because their messages
tend to be much less self-evident. This is not to argue that words are always
clear (or that photographs never are), nor that the category of words expressing
a viewpoint is well-defined, but merely to suggest that it can be easier to
discern a viewpoint in something verbal than in a picture.
If a law requiring a baker to write "Happy Birthday" does not trigger
heightened scrutiny-even though it involved words-because it does not
force the baker to express a message with which she disagreed, then arguably
neither does a law requiring a wedding photographer to take flattering pictures
of a same-sex wedding, assuming that such photographs do not communicate
support of same-sex marriage.
3.

Compelled Words and Images Are Not Always "Speech"

Third, even if photographs were equivalent to words, words-and therefore
photographs-do not always equal "speech" that triggers free speech scrutiny.
That is, speech in the colloquial sense does not always amount to "speech" in
the constitutional sense. 197 As a result, conduct involving words (and
photographs) is not necessarily of First Amendment significance. Indeed, the
argument from the previous section that not all compelled expressive conduct

194 Cf Claudia E. Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (2014) (noting but critiquing that
in the Establishment Clause context, "Courts tend to assume a lower intensity of communicative impact when
religious symbols are at issue than when spoken or written religious words are at issue, manifesting a
hierarchical binary: text is presumed active and privileged over images which are merely passive"); Timothy
Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Synbolic Meaning: TowardA FirstAmendment Ethnography, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2261, 2273 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court's "normative bias in favor of less
'primitive' expression, namely verbal expression, accounts for the current low status of symbolic speech").
195 See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
196 The free speech argument against compelled photography, after all, assumes that the photographers are
forced to express an idea they cannot condone. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 188, at 129 ("Moreover, the
photographs at a wedding must implicitly express a particular viewpoint: Wedding photographers are hired to
create images that convey the idea that the wedding is a beautiful, praiseworthy, even holy event.").
197 SCHAUER, supra note 187, at 91-92 ("[Speech] must be defined by the purpose of a deep theory of
freedom of speech, and not by anything the word 'speech' might mean in ordinary talk.").
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triggers free speech scrutiny is an example.1 98 The question then becomes,
when are words and photographs "speech" and when are they not? 99
a.

Widespread Confusion

This confusion regarding when words/images amount to "speech" is not
limited to wedding photography. In some cases, words are not treated like
speech but are characterized as conduct.200 Title VII's ban on sexual
harassment in the workplace provides an example.201 Verbal comments alone
may create a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.202 The
Supreme Court has characterized this speech as conduct, namely the conduct
of discrimination. 203
Doctors' conversations with their patients-an area of much recent
litigation-is another example. Lower courts have been divided in their

198 See supra Part III.B.2. and accompanying text.
199 See Helen Norton, You Can'tAsk (or Say) That: The FirstAmendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on
DecisionmakerSpeech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 760 (2003) ("A great deal of speech is treated as
unprotected conduct for constitutional purposes."); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 165, 179 (2015) ("Virtually everything humans do requires the use of
language.... If speech is understood to mean human communication, it is literally everywhere.").
200 Winter, supra note 191, at 890 ("[S]ome forms of speech are subject to regulation because they are
tantamount to conduct.").
201 Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing the existence of a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII).
202 See, e.g., Smith v. Nw. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1417 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
verbal conduct without accompanying physical conduct can establish a hostile work environment claim);
Black v. Zaring Homes Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[V]edbal conduct alone can be the basis of a
successful hostile work environment claim."); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th
Cir. 1996) ("Sexually discriminatory verbal intimidation, ridicule, and insults may be sufficiently severe or
pervasive as to . . create an abusive working environment that violates Title VII.").
203 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) ("In Hishon, we rejected the argument that Title VII
infringed employers' First Amendment rights. And more recently, in R.A. V v. [City oj] St. Paul, we cited Title
VII as an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct." (citation omitted)). Arguably, this
dicta is in tension with Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project, which subjects to free speech scrutiny a ban on
material support to certain terrorist organizations as applied to support in the form of advice. 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010). Wisconsin suggests that discrimination in the form of words is best characterized as the conduct of
discrimination. Wisconsin, 508 U.S. at 487. HumanitarianLaw Project suggests that providing aid in the form
of words is best characterized as speech: "The law here may be described as directed at conduct . .. but as
applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statutes consists of communicating a message."
HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724. But the difference may not be due to a change in the Court's
treatment of how to characterize what is regulated but due to how it views the regulations: In Wisconsin, the
regulation was deemed content-neutral, while in HumanitarianLaw Project the Court found it to be contentbased. HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723; see injra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing
current doctrine on conduct/speech mixtures).
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treatment of these exchanges. Take mandatory abortion counseling laws, 204
which require doctors to convey certain information to their abortion
patients.205 More than one state, for example, has demanded that doctors show
and describe an ultrasound of an unwanted pregnancy to women seeking to
terminate.206 The Fifth Circuit viewed this "informed consent" requirement as
essentially regulating conduct, the practice of medicine. 207 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit held that these mandatory ultrasound laws clearly implicate
doctors' free speech rights as well as the regulation of professional conduct,
and applied intermediate scrutiny.208
A similar divide exists with decisions addressing state bans on therapies
designed to make gay people straight, a practice repudiated by the medical
profession. 209 These bans forbid licensed therapists from subjecting minors to
the discredited "gay conversion therapy." 2 10 The Ninth Circuit held that the
practice of therapy, even if talking therapy, is the practice of medicine and

204 The Supreme Court provides minimal guidance on "informed consent" laws directed at abortion
patients. In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, the Supreme Court decision that purported to uphold Roe v. Wade,
the Supreme Court made an opaque comment about mandatory abortion counseling, noting that "[t]o be sure,
the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated... but only as part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State." 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (citations
omitted).
205 State Policies in Brief Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
206 State Policies in Brief Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.
org/statecenter/spibs/spibRFU.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
207 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The
only reasonable reading of Casey's passage is that physicians' rights not to speak are, when 'part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State[.]' This applies to information
that is 'truthful,' 'nonmisleading,' and 'relevant . .. to the decision' to undergo an abortion." (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
208 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) ("We agree with the district court that the
Requirement is a content-based regulation of a medical professional's speech which must satisfy at least
intermediate scrutiny to survive.").
209 After emphasizing that "[t]he most important fact about these 'therapies' is that they are based on a
view of homosexuality that has been rejected by all the major mental health professions," the American
Academy of Pediatrics, American Psychological Association, the American Counseling Association and many
other groups condemned them, finding that attempts to change sexual orientation "have serious potential to
harm young people." JUST THE FACTS COAL., JUST THE FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND YOUTH: A
PRIMER FOR PRINCIPALS, EDUCATORS, AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL 5-6 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/1gbt/
resources/just-the-facts.pdf
210 CAL. BUS.& PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-54 (West 2013).
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therefore conduct that does not trigger any free speech scrutiny. 211 In contrast,
the Third Circuit subjected a similar ban to intermediate scrutiny.212
What free speech principles explain these diverging decisions? It may be
that the courts are using the words "speech" and "conduct" as terms of art that
reflect a conclusion about an issue unrelated to the question of speech versus
conduct. In the sexual harassment example, the Supreme Court may have
decided that the equal protection interests of women trapped in hostile work
environments simply outweighed the speech interests of their harassers. 213In
the medical speech examples, the courts may be struggling with issues relating
to professional speech.2 14 Then again, these determinations may in fact reflect
differing views about speech versus conduct, an issue lurking in all these cases.
Although it reaches speech, Title VII's goal is to end discriminatory conduct in
the workplace. Professional speech is complicated in part because it is speech
made during the course of practicing one's profession, which is conduct.
The regulated activities in these examples could be characterized as
expressive conduct, though perhaps that is not quite the right term. "Expressive
conduct" is most associated with symbolic conduct-that is, nonverbal conduct
that might nonetheless be communicating. The classic example is burning a
flag. We need a term for when "speech is brigaded with action" 215 or for when
speech and conduct are bound up together in a way that creates uncertainty as
to whether it should be treated as speech or conduct. A photographer serving a
customer by taking a picture or a physician treating a patient by talking to them
are both examples.216 More importantly, we need an approach as to how to
211 Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1055 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[The ban] regulates conduct. It bans a form of
medical treatment for minors; .... [T]he fact that speech may be used to carry out those therapies does not
turn the prohibitions of conduct into prohibitions of speech.").
212 King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. King v. Christie,
135 S. Ct 2048 (2015) (mem.) ("We hold that these communications are 'speech' for purposes of the First
Amendment."); see also id. at 225 ("Given that the Supreme Court had no difficulty characterizing legal
counseling as 'speech,' we see no reason here to reach the counter-intuitive conclusion that the verbal
communications that occur during SOCE [sexual orientation change efforts] counseling are 'conduct."').
213 The sexual harassment ban also advances the right of the captive audience to avoid unwanted speech.
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The FirstAmendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV.
939, 943 (2009) ("[F]ree speech jurisprudence does recognize that, in some circumstances, a listener's right to
not hear speech trumps a private speaker's right to convey speech.").
214 See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 944.
215 Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing shouting fire
in a crowded theatre as "a classic case where speech is brigaded with action").
216 A slightly different example of a complicated relationship between speech and conduct is when certain
conduct is a necessary precursor to speech, such as when spending money is necessary to propagate a message,
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treat these types of cases, which appear with regularity. Current doctrine does
not provide a clear road map. The discussion that follows considers possible
approaches rather than delimits current law.
b.

Text vs. Law Approaches

There are two schools of thought on how to decide what conductexpression mixture should be recognized as "speech" for free speech purposes.
Each approach has a fundamentally different focus. One approach concentrates
on the speech that is regulated and the other on the regulation itself,
specifically the goal of the regulation. With one exception, theories that focus
on the speech try to isolate those instances where speech performs as well as
expresses. As to the theories that focus on the regulation's purpose, the claim is
that when the government regulation aims to censor or coerce due to
communicative impact, the words or conduct should be deemed covered
"speech" that triggers free speech scrutiny. Otherwise they should not.217
Neither likely leads to a cognizable free speech claim for the religious wedding
photographers, with the regulation-focused approach essentially precluding
it. 2 18

i.

Focus on Text

While most theories from the first school try to cabin out those instances
when words ought to be treated as conduct rather than speech, one does not.
This more absolutist view basically argues that the presence of words or
21920
photographs
indicates speech covered by the Free Speech Clause.220
or when standing in a particular place is necessary to reach a certain audience. These types of speech-conduct
cases have also been treated inconsistently. Thus, there are at least three categories where the line between
speech and conduct is unclear. The first category is symbolic conduct: conduct that is itself expressive, like
burning something in protest. Second is conduct with an expressive component: conduct that is accompanied
by speech in some way, such as serving customers by taking their picture. Third is conduct that is a necessary
precondition for speech.
217 While this approach was devised with symbolic conduct in mind, it also serves as a way to think about
other speech-conduct mixtures.
218 Recall that in the litigated cases, the religious bakers and photographers were not asked to produce
cakes or pictures with written messages on them. Therefore, while the following analysis will consider those
permutations, they are hypothetical rather than actual cases.
219 The argument applies to the presence of any established medium of communication-braille, film,
cartoons, etc. I list words and photographs because they are the focus of this Article.
220 See, e.g., Franklyn S. Haiman, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1993) ("[T]he thesis of
this book is that a fundamental difference obtains between symbolic and nonsymbolic interactions and that the
First Amendment is always implicated in the former and only occasionally in the latter."); William Van
Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 107, 121 (1982) (arguing that "all
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Proponents include those who support the wedding photographers' free speech
claims against public accommodation laws. 22 1 They argue that this approach
best protects not just religious businesses, but liberal ones too, such as a public
relations firm that does not want to aid an anti-gay organization,222 or a baker
who does not want to ice a pro-KKK message on a cake. 223
Of course, most refusals would
prohibitions, which usually bar
characteristics like race, sex, religion,
no one will be forced to advertise or
because refusing to serve someone
-224
illegal.

not trigger public accommodation law
discrimination based on protected
and, of course, sexual orientation. Thus,
bake for the KKK or other hate groups
due to their hateful ideology is not

In any event, insisting that words (or photographs) always equal "speech"
is too blunt a rule. For example, a restaurant may not decline to serve a black
family or a mixed race couple as discrimination on the basis of race is illegal.
In the course of serving customers, a waiter must talk to them and write down
their orders. Strictly speaking, the law compels speech, both oral and written.
But few, I think, would argue that the anti-discrimination law should trigger
heightened free speech scrutiny. 225 Indeed, even the most vehement free
speech defenders do not argue that every single action that includes words (or

speech is protected from abridging laws made by Congress without exception" and disparaging
"question-begging verbal artifices (e.g., by calling [an irresistible counterexample]
'conduct,'
'speech-brigaded-with-action,' or 'speech-acts')").
221 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 188, at 116.
222 Id Volokh gives the example of a public relations firm forced to write materials for Scientologists
despite thinking the organization was fraudulent. Id. at 127. If people refuse to work for them based on fraud
concerns, they are not discriminating on the basis of religion. If they believe they are fraudulent in the sense of
disagreeing with their own religious beliefs, then it might be better to view the refusal as a religious liberty
case and not a free speech case. Indeed, if the main concern is that they are giving aid to a false religion, then
the complaint is forced facilitation rather than compelled speech. Forcing someone to facilitate an activity they
oppose is different in kind from forcing someone to endorse it.
223 As with most rules, this more formal rule-based view also provides greater clarity.
224 For that same reason, no dry cleaner will be forced to clean Klan robes or a confederate flag.
Granted,
a few jurisdictions protect discrimination based on political affiliation. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1411.02 (West
2013); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 64(3) (2014); SEATTLE, WASH. MUN. CODE §§ 14.06.020(L), 14.06.030(B).
Courts, however, have interpreted this prohibition narrowly. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210,
221 (D.C. 2007) (holding that "'[p]olitical affiliation' means the state of belonging to or endorsing any
political party" and expulsion due to affiliation with hate groups did not constitute discrimination based on
political affiliation prohibited by public accommodation law).
225 Cf Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) ("Congress, for
example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will
require an employer to take down a sign reading 'White Applicants Only' hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating the employer's speech rather than conduct.").
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other recognized mode of communication) must count as "speech": Because
almost everything we do involves words, everything would be subject to
challenge. 226 That still leaves open the question of which words do count.
Assuming not everything involving words automatically equates to covered
227
speech,
other scholars have tried to create categories based on how the
words function. Some categories are "speech" that trigger free speech scrutiny,
some are not. At times, the uncovered words are termed "conduct," especially
if they can be described as doing something rather than saying something.228
"Words are the main technique by which we convey our ideas about facts and
values. Yet, they can also be the medium for doing certain things or attempting
to do certain things." 229

For example, Cass Sunstein argues that words are not protected if they are
performative.230 In trying to explain when words should be considered
conduct, Sunstein lists five categories and argues that only those in the first
category equal conduct. 231 This first category includes speech that acts. These
226 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
227 Schauer, supra note 126, at 1773 ("That the boundaries of the First Amendment are delineated by the
ordinary language meaning of the word 'speech' is simply implausible.").
228 This discussion leaves out two varieties of speech whose "uncovered" status is not controversial. To
start, some words fall into a recognized "unprotected category" of speech. These include fraud, threats,
incitement to imminent lawless action, fighting words, defamation, child porn, and obscenity. Some of these
might be examples of speech that is better characterized as conduct. Others are not conduct but essentially
speech of such low value that it does not merit protection. Until recently, these unprotected categories were
described as those whose harm outweighed any free speech value. The current Supreme Court has applied a
more originalist explanation, arguing these categories are unprotected because they have historically been
unprotected. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
In addition, there are still other types of speech (in the colloquial sense) that have simply not set off
free speech alarm bells. See generally Schauer, supra note 126. Indeed, some argue that there are large swathes
of speech that have never raised constitutional concern. As Fred Schauer has observed, "Although the First
Amendment refers to freedom of 'speech,' much speech remains totally untouched by it." Id. at 1765. For
example, Kent Greenawalt points out that many crimes ranging from blackmail to armed robbery involve
speech, yet no one would think of challenging them on free speech grounds. Kent Greenawalt, Criminal
Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (1983); see also Arnold H. Loewy,
DistinguishingSpeech from Conduct, 45 MERCER L. REV. 621, 622 (1994) ("A significant number of crimes
either require or frequently involve communication.... I am aware of no serious argument that any of this
'speech' ought to be constitutionally protected.").
229 Greenawalt, supra note 228, at 1091.
230 Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 836 (1993);
see also SCHAUER,
supra note 187, at 102-03 ("Initially, we can easily exclude most performative uses of language.... Some
words advocate conduct. Others are closer to the conduct itself, or are the conduct itself.").
231 Sunstein suggests that
we might distinguish among (a) speech that amounts to the commission of an independently
illegal act or that is evidence that the act has been committed; (b) speech that creates or
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words do not merely cause action, "they constitute the relevant action or
provide evidence of an action." 232
The statement "I won't serve you because you are black" is an act and
evidence of discriminating against someone because of their race. Conversely,
forcing someone to talk to and write down the order of a black customer is
merely compelling them to do an act-the act of providing restaurant service.
According to Sunstein, apart from this category, everything else that involves
words, plus expressive conduct, would trigger free speech scrutiny.233
Greenawalt's situation-altering utterances provide another example of an
attempt to identify which words ought to be categorized as conduct.234
Uncovered situation-altering utterances include those that alter our obligations
or rights.235 For example, "By speaking marriage vows . . a person can
radically change his or her legal relations with someone else." 236 The same
might be said of offers, agreements, and promises.237 The two theories overlap:
Sunstein might describe the recitation of wedding vows ("I do") as the act and
evidence of marrying someone. These cursory summaries are obviously
incomplete, and other scholars have created their own taxonomies, but they
should suffice for the purposes of this Article.

constitutes conditions that can constitutionally be made illegal; (c) speech that leads immediately
to illegality; (d) speech that is produced as a result of illegality; and (e) speech that leads
proximately, but not immediately, to illegality or otherwise to constitutionally cognizable harm.
Sunstein, supra note 230, at 836.
232 Sunstein writes,
The written or oral statement, "You're fired," is an act, not merely speech, in the sense that the
words are simply a way of conmmitting an unlawful discharge. The statement, "I agree to fix
prices with you," is a way of fixing prices, indeed the most efficient way of doing so. These
words do not merely cause action; they constitute the relevant action.
Id at 837.
233 id
234 Greenawalt, supra note 228, at 1091 ("[T]he utterance of some kinds of words in some kinds of
circumstances actually changes the settings in which we live. These utterances are situation-altering.").
235 Cf Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
"Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2005)
("'Situation-altering utterances,' as the book defines them, certainly do not cover all attempts to 'do things
with words' or to 'alter' the 'situation' by speaking.").
236 Greenawalt, supra note 228, at 1091.
237 id
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ii. Text Approach Applied
How does the text approach apply to the various wedding vendor scenarios
discussed so far? For the most part, cakes with written messages or
photographs of a wedding ceremony do not perform any act or alter any
situation. 23 At the same time, the refusal to render services does, since it is the
act of discrimination. Much of the analysis turns on whether the
communicative and conduct strands can be separated out.
Bakers and photographers are not analogous in this respect. Bakers whose
customers request a message that clashes with their beliefs have a compromise
option available. Like the baker who was asked to make the Bible shaped cake
with homophobic Bible verses, they can make the cake but decline to write the
message.239 Because the words cannot be characterized as performative or
situation-altering, had state law compelled the writing, that compulsion would
trigger some free speech scrutiny. (As it happens, public accommodation law
would compel nothing since her refusal to write a homophobic message was
not based on a protected characteristic.)240 Of course, triggering free speech
scrutiny does not automatically result in a free speech violation. It merely
means that the compulsion implicates free speech concerns.
This compromise solution is not available to the photographer asked to take
wedding pictures. With the request for a cake bearing a written message, it was
arguably possible to disentangle conduct (providing baking services) and
speech (writing the message). It is not an entirely clean separation, since
writing on the cake is part of the baking service, but it is at least a workable
one. Photography, however, does not lend itself to such disentangling. 241
In the end, the inability to separate out conduct and speech in photographic
services may not matter. A cake with "God supports same-sex marriage" is not
analogous to a photograph of a same-sex marriage. Even if no one attributes
238 One could argue that every utterance alters the world to some extent. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Of
Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: CeremonialDeism and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J.
705, 734 (2010) ("Over the course of the series of lectures that came to be published as How to Do Things with
Words, Austin's analysis therefore shifted from distinguishing performatives from constatives to establishing
that performative force . . is a property of all utterances."). I mean to work within the framework of scholars
like Sunstein and Greenawalt.
239 Gathright & Lupher, supra note 176.
240 i.
241 Other services such as printing also do not lend themselves to such disentangling.
In any event,
printing a menu card for a wedding does not read as endorsing the marriage any more than photographing the
event does.
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the (very clear) message to the baker, she still has to write it out. She is forced
to articulate a viewpoint contrary to her own. 242 In contrast, for the reasons
discussed earlier, a wedding photographer's picture of same-sex wedding
should not be read as endorsing same-sex marriage.243 In other words, wedding
photographs may ultimately not trigger free speech scrutiny not because they
are performative or situation-altering, but because they do not force the
photographers to convey a message with which they disagree. Even if such a
message existed, however, a studio's taking of photographs presents a
conduct-speech mixture, where the provision of a service is conduct and the
pro-marriage message is speech.
It may help to compare the wedding services to other services where the
messages are more clear. Turning to medical speech, "gay reparative therapy"
seems like performative speech, and therefore conduct. Therapy is medical
treatment. Even if treatment is in the form of speech, providing health care
with the goal of making a sick person well appears to be conduct.
Traditional informed consent, where the doctor informs the patient of the
medical risks and benefits of a proposed medical treatment and its alternatives,
is harder to categorize. The doctor is not actually providing medical care per
se, since telling patients about the procedure does not itself alter a patient's
health. Rather, it is speech about providing the care. Does its close link to
medical treatment nonetheless make it less than pure speech? That is, is being
speech ancillary but necessarily linked to the provision of medical care enough
to move it from speech to a speech-conduct mix? 244 As for mandatory
informed consent about abortion, the further the information strays from
traditional informed consent, the less it can be considered providing or even

242 Some might argue that because the message "God loves same-sex marriage" would not be attributed to
the baker, the baker should not have a free speech claim. However, as discussed earlier, I assume that free
speech concerns are triggered when someone is forced to express a viewpoint contrary to her own, even if the
public does not attribute that message to her. The photographer lacks a claim because the photograph does not
read as "God loves same-sex marriage," never mind that the photographer does.
243 No one is likely to read it as the photographer's endorsement of marriage, which was the
photographer's primary claim. It might be argued that the photograph in general supports same-sex marriage,
and therefore, like the bakers, the photographers are forced to articulate a point of view with which they
(vehemently) disagree. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed earlier, professional photographs produced by
shops open to the public ought not be read as endorsing the people or events depicted. And if there is no
message of support for marriage equality, then there is no free speech claim.
244 Perhaps informed consent's close connection to medical care matters only at the balancing and not the
categorization stage. In that case, even if informed consent is speech, it is ultimately justified by the
government's compelling interests in ensuring safe and ethical medical care.
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ancillary to providing medical care and therefore the closer it moves to speech
that triggers heightened scrutiny. 245
To the extent these categories are unclear, the difficulty may call into
question the utility of attempting to classify words as conduct, speech, or a
speech-conduct mixture.246 On the other hand, perhaps the real difficulty is not
so much in isolating those performative or situation-altering words (or
photographs) that amount to conduct, but in determining which words
constitute pure speech as opposed to a speech-conduct mixture. If so, perhaps
this initial inquiry, if it is adopted at all, should be limited to identifying those
words (or photographs) that ought to be considered pure conduct that do not
trigger any free speech analysis. If so, however helpful this analysis may be for
addressing doctor's conversations with their patients, it is of more limited use
for wedding vendors whose products include words or photographs, as
wedding cakes and pictures are not performative or situation-altering and
therefore cannot be considered belonging to this pure conduct category.247
iii. Regulation-FocusedApproach
An altogether different approach concentrates on the regulation rather than
the speech. Moreover, in deciding whether confusing speech-conduct should
count as covered speech rather than uncovered conduct, what matters is the
regulation's purpose. John Hart Ely, for example, argued that because
expressive conduct was "100% action and 100% expression,"248 the focus
should not be on categorizing the expressive conduct but on examining the
regulation's purpose.249 Other scholars agree: "The state's purposes . . . are

245 The more attenuated link with medical care also makes the state's interest weaker as well, at least as
with regard to regulating the practice of medicine.
246 Cf Greenawalt, supra note 228, at 1095 ("If the borderline problems are intrinsically
too great,
however, or afford unacceptable opportunities for officials to perpetrate abuses in individual cases or to
systematically draw lines that are at odds with free speech values, then that possible basis for classification
must be abandoned.").
247 As discussed earlier, wedding photographs ultimately may not trigger free speech scrutiny not because
they are performative or situation-altering, but because they do not force the photographers to convey a
message with which they disagree.
248 Ely, supra note 179, at 1495 ("But burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an
undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time
communication, and no communication that does not result from conduct.").
249 Ely, supra note 179, at 1496 (approving "an inquiry into whether the governmental interest or interests
that support the regulation are related to the suppression of expression").
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dispositive." 250 Again, while these theories were developed with expressive
conduct in mind, they apply equally well to other types of speech-conduct
mixtures.251

According to the regulation-focused school, if the law targets
communicative harms, then the expressive conduct is covered and the law
triggers free speech scrutiny. 252 However, "[t]here is no First Amendment
'pass' from a law whose purpose is not to punish speech." 253 Since that
formulation addresses government censorship, the rule for government
compulsion needs to be slightly modified. For compelled speech claims, then,
the rule would be: If the government's purpose is to compel the saying of
words (or the taking of pictures) because of their communicative impact, then
they are covered and trigger free speech protection. On the other hand, if the
state's purpose is to regulate conduct harms, then the Free Speech Clause is not
implicated.
iv. Regulation-FocusedApproach Applied
The regulation-focused approach simplifies some "speech brigaded with
conduct" cases.254 In particular, the challenges to public accommodations law
become much easier because the goal of anti-discrimination protections is to
ensure equal access and equal opportunity.255 Thus, anti-discrimination laws
can be characterized as regulating conduct, and under the government purpose
approach, anything affected by them will likewise be classified as "conduct,"
or at least not "speech." Accordingly, free speech challenges to public
accommodation laws should be dismissed.

250 Jed Rubenfeld, The FirstAmendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001) ("The actor's
purposes are not relevant to free speech analysis. The state's purposes, on the other hand, are dispositive."
(emphasis omitted)).
251 See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing different types of speech-conduct categories).
252 See Ely, supra note 179, at 1497 ("The critical question would therefore seem to be whether the harm
that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more
particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his message, or rather would arise even if the
defendant's conduct had no communicative significance whatever.").
253 Rubenfeld, supra note 250, at 768.
254 SCHAUER, supra note 187, at 11I ("In the case of censorship of art, as with many other free speech
cases, focus on the reasons for the regulation rather than the objects of the regulation solves what at first sight
appear to be difficult puzzles.").
255 For example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act states that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
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And yet, perhaps it is not quite that simple, as this analysis assumes a
single legislative purpose and laws may have more than one. In fact, public
accommodation laws aim to prevent two distinct harms, one of which is
expressive. The first harm, as already mentioned, is the denial of equal access
to goods and services. But the second harm targeted is the denial of equal
citizenship256 and equal dignity.257 'The state's goal here is to avoid condoning
discrimination, which sends a message of second-class citizenship to members
of historically subordinated groups who are denied the ability to eat, shop, and
play in the same way as everyone else. 258 "To be told that you are not wanted
at the lunch counter . .. is to be told-in the most public way imaginable-that
you are not good enough to sit with those who are the real citizens."259 Or as
explained by a mother whose son sued after a bakery refused to serve him and
his fiance, "It was never about the cake. It was about my son being treated like
a lesser person."260 In short, part of the regulation is aimed at the message
communicated by the denial of service. 261
Does this mean that public accommodations laws cannot be fairly
characterized as designed to regulate conduct? In a way, this question
represents a reappearance of the "all conduct has an expressive component"
problem. Recall that part of the difficulty of categorizing what counts as
covered expressive conduct was that all conduct potentially had an expressive
component.262 Consequently, it is not surprising that all regulation of conduct
potentially has an expressive goal.

256 Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at GroundLevel: The Consequences ofNonstate Action, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1591, 1594 (2005) ("[E]qual access to public accommodations [is] a telling indicator of civil freedom and
equal citizenship.").
257 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) ("The fundamental object of
Title II was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to
public establishments."').
258 In re Klein, CR 44-14, 45-14 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. Apr. 21 2015) ("When Respondents
denied RBC and LBC a wedding cake, their act was more than the denial of the product. It was, and is, a
denial of RBC's and LBC's freedom to participate equally. It is the epitome of being told there are places you
cannot go, things you cannot do . . or be." (ellipsis in original)).
259 Karst, supra note 256, at 1594-95.
260 Deborah Munn, It Was Never About the Cake, ACLU BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:00 PM), https://www.
aclu.org/blog/religion-belief-lgbt-rights/it-was-never-about-cake.
261 Bagenstos, supra note 90, at 1229 ("When a restaurant gives equal service to black and white
customers, it necessarily sends the message that blacks and whites deserve equal service.").
262 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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Yet just as all conduct cannot be deemed expressive conduct, 263 all
regulation of conduct cannot be considered targeting expression. As before, to
hold otherwise would simply collapse the distinction between speech and
conduct, and raise the specter of endless free speech challenges to social and
economic regulations.264 How then, should regulations with dual conduct and
expressive goals (like anti-discrimination laws) be classified?
One solution might be that in order to count as a conduct regulation that
does not trigger free speech protection, the regulation of conduct must be the
main or but-for goal. At a minimum, this means that the government would
still have passed the law even if it only affected conduct. 265
Anti-discrimination laws would meet easily this requirement. As the Supreme
Court once noted, "[A]cts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of
publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that
government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point
of view such conduct may transmit." 266

The ban on "gay conversion therapy" would also meet this requirement.
Generally, if the goal of a regulation is the safe practice of medicine (conduct),
then it will not trigger free speech scrutiny. Thus, if the government outlaws
gay conversion therapy because it is bad medicine and harms patients, then it is
a regulation of conduct. What if, similar to anti-discrimination law, a ban has
dual goals, and also targets the practice because of the message it conveyedi.e., that homosexuality is a disease that should be cured? Like
anti-discrimination law, the anti-therapy law would still not trigger the Free
Speech Clause provided the legislature would have passed the ban even
without its expressive goal. As for abortion "informed consent" laws, whether
they merit free speech scrutiny turns on whether their true goal is to safeguard
women's health or to advance a pro-life message.267 Again, if the main goal is
263 In deciding whether conduct with an expressive component was covered, this Article had earlier
suggested, at least with regard to compelled expressive conduct, that a regulation of expressive conduct would
not trigger free speech scrutiny unless it forced speakers to express a message contrary to their viewpoints.
264 See supra notes 139-46, 133-36, 150-56 and accompanying text.
265 It might also mean that the government would not have passed the law had it only affected the
expressive component.
266 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (rejecting a First Amendment freedom of
association challenge to public accommodation law and concluding that "[a]ccordingly, like violence or other
types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact,
such practices are entitled to no constitutional protection").
267 What about regulations requiring traditional informed consent? They do not regulate conduct:
Informed consent does not itself heal people, although is it bound up with the practice of medicine. That still
leaves open the question of whether traditional informed consent is pure speech or a conduct-speech mix. In
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unrelated to the safe practice of medicine, then it would not be considered a
regulation of conduct. 268
Would treating some regulations with dual goals as conduct regulations be
too easy to exploit? There is a risk that as long as the state articulates an
ostensible conduct goal, it can target people's communication with
impunity.269 Indeed, O 'Brien might provide a cautionary tale.270 In O 'Brien,
the Supreme Court upheld a law banning the burning of draft cards, and in
doing so, outlawed a powerful means of protest.271 Although the Court
ultimately assumed without deciding that the Free Speech Clause applied, it
could have and likely would have held otherwise under the proposed
inquiry 272: The O 'Brien Court accepted the government's claim that the main
purpose of the law was to ensure the smooth functioning of the draft at a time
273
274
of war. The effect on expression was therefore deemed merely incidental.
In reality, the law was designed to target a particular form of political
protest. 275

A Court that forthrightly addressed the question would have reached a
different conclusion than the one hinted at by the O Brien Court. In all
likelihood, Congress would not have passed the challenged amendment if it
other words, how tightly linked must it be with the practice of medicine to raise a question at all? Must it be
speech that occurs during the course of the conduct? Necessary to the course of conduct? Notably, the
tightness of its link may depend on how the practice of medicine is defined. Is the practice of medicine defined
as safely healing people, or is it safely and ethically healing people while respecting their autonomy?
268 Similarly, a law forbidding doctors from inquiring about their patients' gun ownership, which has the
stated goal of protecting patient privacy rather than ensuring safe medical practice, would not be considered a
regulation of conduct. Cf Wollschlaegerv. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 869 (1lth Cir. 2015).
269 Cf Ely, supra note 179, at 1496 ("Restrictions on free expression are rarely defended on the ground
that the state simply didn't like what the defendant was saying; reference will generally be made to some
danger beyond the message. . . .").
270 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-72 (1968).
271 Granted, the illegality contributed to the power of the symbolic act of burning one's draft card.
272 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
273 Id at 377-80 (describing the "many functions performed by Selective Service certificates").
274 Id at 382 ("For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, [O'Brien] was
convicted.").
275 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind Cognitive Enhancement
and the Constitution,2010 Wis. L. REV. 1049, 1089 ("Even in O'Brien itself, the court seemed to simply brush
aside powerful evidence that the measure reviewed in that case was aimed at suppressing anti-war speech.");
see 111 CONG. REc. 19871 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1965) (remarks of Representative Bmy) ("The need of this
legislation is clear. Beatniks and so-called 'campus-cults' have been publicly burning their draft cards to
demonstrate their contempt for the United States and our resistance to Communist takeovers."); 111 CONG.
REc. 19746, 20433 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1965) (remarks of Senator Thurmond) ("It is not fitting for our country
to permit such conduct while our people are giving their lives in combat with the enemy.").

2015]

SPEECH OR CONDUCT?

297

had no effect on anti-war expression. 276 After all, existing laws already
protected draft cards. 277 Moreover, this was not really a difficult call, despite
the Court's protestations. 278 Consequently, the law barring draft cards was
actually a regulation of expression masquerading as a regulation of conduct.
Still, the question remains whether the regulation-focused test is more
susceptible to manipulation than the text-focused one.279
Neither school is free of difficult line-drawing. Nor am I sure whether it is
possible, or desirable, to adopt only one school to the exclusion of the other.
Existing free speech jurisprudence overall relies on both. Often free speech
analysis starts by examining the regulated speech and asking whether it is
covered "speech." 28 0 The focus then usually shifts to whether the challenged
regulation is content-based or content-neutral-itself a proxy for determining
the government's goals.281 The doctrine with respect to speech-conduct mixes
in particular is unsettled, though arguably both schools aid the analysis of it.282
276 Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1204 n.117
(1996) ("Congress clearly understood, and indeed intended, the law to penalize antidraft expression.").
277 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 387-88 ("[T]he present provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to the
destruction of Government property may appear broad enough to cover all acts having to do with the
mistreatment of draft cards in the possession of individuals." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 747 (1965)).
278 Stewart Jay, The Creation of the FirstAmendment Right to Free Expression. From the Eighteenth
Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 990 (2008) ("Considerable naivete
would be needed to doubt that the motivating factor in Congress' action [in enacting the Selective Service Act]
was dealing with draft card burners who were dramatizing their objections to the war. In addition to explicit
statements made on the floor to this effect, the congressional conuittee reports [made] clear a concern with
the "defiant" destruction of so-called "draft cards" and with "open" encouragement to others to destroy their
cards."').
279 Trying to figure out whether a law that affects both conduct and expression was primarily targeting
speech bears more than a passing relationship to the actual O'Brien test. Once it is clear that expressive
conduct is at issue, the O 'Brien test asks whether the challenged law is "unrelated to the suppression of
speech" and whether it passes scrutiny. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The major difference is that the O'Brientest
applies to covered speech, while the proposed inquiry is meant to decide whether the Free Speech Clause is
implicated at all.
280 For example, a court might first decide whether challenged speech fell into an unprotected category of
speech. See, e.g., supra note 228 (listing categories of unprotected speech). When analyzing a free speech
challenge by a public employee, the first question is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen or as the
state; the former would be covered by the Free Speech Clause, the latter would not. See Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006).
281 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose. The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 414 (1996) ("First Amendment law, as developed by the
Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of
improper governmental motives.").
282 Arguably, the Supreme Court has not been consistent in its approach towards words that are bound up
with conduct. See supra note 203 (discussing possible tensions between Wisconsin and Humanitarian Law
Project). In FAIR, the Supreme Court seemed more focused on the regulation, rejecting a compelled speech
challenge to a law requiring schools to send information emails in the course of providing equal access to
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For conduct bound up with words (or photographs or other established
mode of communication), a synthesized approach for deciding whether free
speech applies might have two steps. The first step would be to identify and
designate as uncovered those words and photographs that should be considered
conduct because they are performative or situation-altering. If what remains
communicates a message with which the speaker disagrees, the next step
would be to examine the challenged regulation's goals. If the primary bona
fide goal is to regulate conduct, then a free speech analysis may not be
warranted.

To summarize, the photographers' claims are not analogous to the
compelled speech claims of Barnette and Wooley. To begin with, the
compelled photographs do not necessarily communicate a clear message at
odds with their speakers' beliefs the same way the compelled statements in
those classic cases did (or the way "God loves same-sex marriage" iced on a
cake does). Moreover, compelling the utterance of words or the taking of
photographs is not always "speech" covered by Free Speech Clause.283
Although wedding photographs would not be considered conduct because they
are performative or situation-altering, they might ultimately be classified as
"conduct" based on the goal of public accommodations law, which is to end
the conduct of discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. At the
very least, the public accommodations law's anti-discrimination goals, plus the
way the speech of photography and the conduct of providing services are

military recruiters on campus: "The compelled speech to which the law schools point is plainly incidental to
the Solomon Amendment's regulation of conduct, and 'it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) (citation omitted). In HumanitarianLaw Project, on
the other hand, the Court seemed more focused on the use of language, noting that the law's overall goal might
be regulation of conduct, but "as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists
of communicating a message." Holderv. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2710, 2724 (2010). Then
again, FAIR might have been more willing to focus on the government's purpose because the compelled words
were merely factual and not ideological. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62 (noting that the compelled speech was
"compelled statements of fact"). And HumanitarianLaw Projectmay have focused more on the words bound
up with conduct because the goal of the content-based regulation was to censor a particular type of
communication.
283 Again, the question is whether the speech is "speech" that triggers free speech protection rather than
whether the speech is ultimately protected by the Free Speech Clause. It could be "speech" yet be unprotected
because the law passes heightened scrutiny.
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intertwined, suggests it is not a regulation of pure speech as in Barnette and
Wooley.
CONCLUSION

The question for this Article is not whether the wedding vendors' would
win their compelled speech claim, but whether they have a free speech claim to
begin with. The bakers do not. 284 The photographers probably do not either. 285
Nonetheless, would it not be easier to acknowledge or at least assume that the
cake-baking and photo-taking involve speech, and subject public
accommodation laws to heightened scrutiny. In other words, why spend so
much effort discounting the free speech element? After all, the wedding
vendors' free speech claims could easily fail. The state has not just an
*
286
important interest but a compelling interest in ending discrimination.
As
discussed above, every time the state permits a wedding baker, or
photographer, or shopkeeper, to effectively hang a "no gays allowed" sign, it
creates significant harms.287 It denies equal access to good and services288 and
it denies equal citizenship.289 Furthermore, there is no other way to guarantee
full access and citizenship other than to bar these refusals.
Perhaps requiring courts to directly address the clash between
constitutional values-speech vs. equality-is actually the better solution
because it would be more transparent. It is true that courts shy away from such
direct balancing of competing interests, but perhaps they should not. If value
judgments inform their decision-making, those judgments ought to be made

284 See supra Part II.
285 See supra Part III.
286 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (describing state public accommodations law as
"reflect[ing] the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens
equal access to publicly available goods and services" and concluding "[t]hat goal, which is unrelated to the
suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order").
287 Deborah Munn, mother of Charlie Craig, a gay man who was denied service by Masterpiece
Cakeshop, stated that "[w]hat should have been a joyous occasion had turned into a humiliating occasion."
Munn, supra note 260.
288 Jami Contreras, a woman whose baby was denied medical service because she and her partner are gay,
stated "[i]t was embarrassing. It was humiliating . . It's just wrong." Baldas, supra note 153 (ellipses in
original).
289 David Mullins, a gay man who was refused service by Masterpiece Cakeshop for his wedding, stated
that "[b]eing told and treated unequally, it makes you feel like a second-class citizen. It makes you feel like
you matter less than the person standing next to you." Why Some Wedding Businesses Say "IDon't" to Gay
Couples, supra note 5.
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plain. So why not just err on the side of speech protection? 290 I want to resist
that impulse for two reasons.
First, as discussed earlier, the current jurisprudential climate counsels
against automatic sympathy to free speech claims. In particular, concerns about
misusing the Free Speech Clause in ways reminiscent of Lochner-era courts'
misuse of substantive due process suggests some wariness may be in order.291
In earlier times, courts might have struck down regulations as interfering with
contract and property rights; today they are more likely to strike them down as
interfering with First Amendment rights. 292 "Across the country, plaintiffs are
using the First Amendment to challenge commercial regulations .

. .

. It is no

exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has become a powerful
engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are palpable." 293
Free speech claims that would have been summarily rejected in past years are
now being taken seriously.294 That it is even necessary to address the free
speech claims of wedding vendors may reflect the popularity and success of
"free speech opportunism" 295 or 'tree speech expansionism." 296 I want to push
back against this trend, especially given the recent challenges to
anti-discrimination regulations.

&

290 See, e.g., Gottry, supra note 143, at 1000 ("While not all cases [of potential expressive conduct]
provide a clear answer to this question, courts should err on the side of protecting expression.").
291 Leslie Kendrick, FirstAmendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1208-09 (2015)
("These [free speech] claims mirror Lochner-era claims in their structure: they posit a constitutional right, held
by business interests (be they sole proprietors or corporate entities), which immunizes them from government
regulation, often regulation that relies upon state interests in public health, safety, and welfare.").
292 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of FirstAmendment Coverage, 56 WM.
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1629 (2015) ("The opportunistic lawyer or client seeking a way of fighting against some
form of regulation or prosecution can now have increased confidence that an argument from the First
Amendment will not be received with political scorn or doctrinal incredulity.").
293 Post & Shanor, supra note 199, at 166-67.
294 See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 291, at 1205 ("As others have observed, litigants are raising First
Amendment claims when earlier they never would have done so."); Schauer, supra note 292, at 1616 ("What
is most interesting about these various claims and arguments is not merely that some of them have been taken
seriously. Rather, it is that they have been advanced at all, in contrast to what would have been expected a
generation ago, when the suggestion that the First Amendment was even applicable to some of these activities
would far more likely have produced judicial laughter or incredulity, if not Rule 11 sanctions." (footnote
omitted)).
295 See generally Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGLANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 175-76 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
296 See Kendrick, supra note 291, at 1200, 1209.
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Second (and relatedly),297 I want to resist that impulse to automatic
sympathy because I think we tend to overvalue First Amendment rights, and
that overvaluing tends to come at the expense of equality. 298 American
exceptionalism vis-a-vis hate speech exemplifies this tendency. Unlike most
other countries, the United States protects hate speech.299 John Powell
describes how after a racist incident on campus, many recognize the possible
free speech repercussions of potential speech restrictions, but fail to understand
the equal opportunity consequences for students of color. 300 Furthermore, he
continues, "To the extent that they recognize the equal opportunity issues, they
see these as trumped by free speech concerns."301
That the powerful gain more from speech than equality might explain this
state of affairs. 302 Everyone, including the powerful, benefits from free speech.
(Some might argue that ever since money has been equated with speech,
especially the powerful benefit.) In contrast, members of historically
subordinated groups are the ones who benefit most directly from equality. And
while our speech jurisprudence is premised on deep distrust of government

297 Heyman, supra note 126, at 233 ("[T]he conservative-libertarian view affords too much protection to
speech that injures, abuses, or degrades other people.").
298 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech Exceptionalism.
Pervasive Distrust of Government and the ContemporaryFirstAmendment, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 689 (2015)
("The First Amendment is exceptional. In the United States, we privilege speech at the expense of other
(constitutional) values, including equality, privacy, and dignity.").
299 Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless. Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 IND. L.J. 963, 976
(2009) ("The U.S. approach, in which racist speech is protected except when it constitutes a threat, contrasts
quite strongly with the treatment of racist speech worldwide. For instance, more than thirty European countries
place restrictions on racist speech."); see also Michael Selmi, ProvingIntentionalDiscrimination. The Reality
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 347-48 (1997) ("[I]n the area of hate speech the Court has
chosen to emphasize freedom of speech over racial equality, even though there is nothing in the Constitution to
suggest that when speech and equality conflict, speech should win.").
300 John A. Powell, Worlds Apart. Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 11-12
(1997) ("For instance, after a series of racial incidents on a college campus, I often get calls from reporters.
They are almost always interested in whether explicit racist incitements might lead to the consideration of
policies to limit speech by the college. Very few express concern about the rise of explicit racism and the
consequent threat to equal opportunity for minority groups on college campuses. Most of these reporters see
the problem through the lens of free speech, because that is the narrative in which they are comfortable or

accustomed.").
301 Powell, supra note 300, at 21 ("In our legal history, and even today, there is often the assumption that
the First Amendment is the essential amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment is the unessential or
epiphenomenal amendment.").
302 Cf Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (describing his "interest convergence" theory as postulating that "[t]he
interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests

of whites").
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regulation, that distrust seems to be selective. 303 Given the tendency to protect
speech at the expense of equality, I see no reason to add another thumb to the
scales and automatically assume speech is in fact at issue in potential clashes
between speech and equality.
I am not saying that equality automatically trumps speech. Rather, I am
saying that speech should not automatically trump equality. There is no
denying that we need speech in order to maximize equality. 304 Countless social
movements, including the LBGT one, have relied on the freedom of speech to
fight for recognition of their dignity and rights. It is also true, however, that we
need equality in order to have the fullest flourishing of speech.305

303 See Schauer, supra note 126, at 1786.
304 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence 1II, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 435 ("Blacks know and value the protection the first amendment affords those of us who
must rely upon our voices to petition both government and our neighbors for redress of grievances.").
305 See, e.g., id. at 452 (arguing that hate speech shuts down debate: "If the purpose of the first
amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech, then racial insults disserve that purpose. Assaultive
racist speech functions as a preemptive strike. The racial invective is experienced as a blow, not a proffered
idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue will follow.").

